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“The economic transmission of power without wires is of all-surpassing importance to man.

By its means he will gain complete mastery of the air, the sea and the desert.

It will enable him to dispense with the necessity of mining, pumping, transporting and burning
fuel, and so do away with innumerable causes of sinful waste.

By its means, he will obtain at any place and in any desired amount, the energy of remote
waterfalls—to drive his machinery, to construct his canals, tunnels and highways, to
manufacture the materials of his want, his clothing and food, to heat and light his home—year
in, year out, ever and ever, by day and by night.

It will make the living glorious sun his obedient, toiling slave.

It will bring peace and harmony on earth.”

Nikola Tesla, 1905.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The electricity grid as it currently exists – a vast network of electricity production and
consumption nodes, connected by mammoth transmission wires – is a testament to
one of the most fundamental properties of electricity: it is not a stock but a flow.
Electricity is energy, and traditionally societies have used high-energy density objects
produced by the natural world as an intermediary means of storing energy until it was
needed. Most recently, fossil fuels proved a very effective means of distributing this
potential energy through a society, but have done so at a high cost to the environment.
Advances in energy technology have spurred nearly all of the great turning points in
the history of humankind, with the advent of agriculture, horsepower and fossil fuels
each ushering in their own new age and social structure. Now in the early years of the
twenty-first century we find ourselves on the brink of another period of immense
change; the fossil-fuel based society of the past two centuries must adapt to the reality
of climate change and diminishing natural resources, or fall victim to its own insatiable
appetite for energy. Fortunately our planet is well-endowed with a nearly inexhaustible
energy source in the radiation provided by our sun, but the adaptation from our current
dependence on fossil fuels will require massive improvements in the ways we obtain,
deploy and consume the energy that fuels and sustains our society.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the use of fossil fuels must be phased out in
favor of electricity. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
asserted that by the year 2050, carbon emissions must be brought to 80% below the
1990 level in order to reduce the likelihood of dangerous anthropogenic climate effects
(Solomon, 2007). A recent report found that for California to achieve this goal, end-use
energy consumption will need to be electrified, with electricity accounting for 55% of
end-use energy in 2050, versus 15% today (Williams et al., 2012). Furthermore, this
electricity will need to come from decarbonized suppliers, meaning that renewable
resources will be the electricity generators of the future. This transition will make the
ability to cheaply and efficiently store electricity an absolute necessity.
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Electricity cannot truly be stored but must be either maintained chemically in a
battery or converted to an alternate, storable, form of energy that can later be
converted back to electricity for future use. Producers of electricity have never been
able to effectively “bottle up” a unit of electricity and sell it to consumers in the manner
that other commodities are sold in a conventional market. The commoditization of
electricity necessitated the development of the grid, a system that would allow the
electricity produced at fossil-fuel powered plants to make its way to end-users. The
mammoth electricity transmission and distribution wires that crisscross all modern
countries characterize the 20th century paradigm of energy use, which consisted of a
centralized load serving entity coordinating the output of a number of large power
plants, connected by massive transmission lines. The urgent need to begin using
renewables to produce the massive amounts of energy consumed by our society,
however, paired with rapid advances in the technology that will enable such a
transformation, mean that this paradigm is under threat, along with the institutions that
formed alongside it.
This paradigm shift will present major challenges to those responsible for
maintaining a reliable electricity grid. The clean energy produced by intermittent
renewables is highly desirable from an environmental standpoint, but it presents a
major problem to utilities trying to match electricity supply with demand on the grid: it is
not dispatchable. Resources like wind and solar generation produce energy only when
the weather allows, while electricity consumers conduct their energy-intensive business
in effective ignorance of where the electricity comes from. For an operator of the grid
that needs to indiscriminately and instantaneously supply energy to end-users across
the system, this presents a significant technical challenge, not to mention the economic
issues that are associated with goods that cannot be stored.
At its very core the industry of creating and distributing energy is not a competitive
one but has traditionally been treated as a “natural monopoly” over generation assets
and distributional equipment, where utilities are allowed to own and operate
transmission and distribution lines in order to provide electricity to consumers at a
regulated price. Regulation means that consumers are protected from the exercise of
excessive monopoly power, but is also a source of inefficiencies that would not exist in
3

a truly competitive market. In the electricity “market” as it currently exists, supply is
limited and inelastic in the short run due to the formidable economic and regulatory
barriers involved in the construction of a traditional, fossil-fuel powered power plant.
Meanwhile it can be difficult to predict an electricity demand that is the result of the
aggregated behavior of millions of consumers that are not quick to change their
behavior based on price signals, although slightly more price elasticity has been
demonstrated in the medium to long-run in California (Borenstein, 2009). Furthermore,
the difficulties involved in tracking a unit of electricity as it travels through a physically
complex grid with few capabilities of internal feedback make the principle of marginal
cost pricing, an important feature of any competitive market, a virtual impossibility.
The development of energy storage systems (ESS) within this electricity grid, paired
with the deployment of other “smart grid” technologies, could potentially address many
of the technical and economic issues faced by the California energy sector. A “smarter”
grid paired with effective price signals would incentivize electricity consumers to take
more control over their electricity use, using energy storage and other load-shifting
techniques to capitalize upon price differentials that would reflect the true cost of
producing electricity at its time of use. Appropriate deployment of ESS could also
eliminate the ease with which energy suppliers can exercise market power by
decoupling supply and demand, allowing the grid itself to monitor and respond to
market fluctuations. Lastly and perhaps most importantly in the context of California,
storage has the potential to “smooth” and temporally shift the supply of electricity from
RES, a service that will be of great value to the state as it moves towards lower-carbon
energy sources.
California has traditionally been a leader in the United States in terms of
environmental action; one of the boldest steps the state has taken towards
sustainability in recent years has been the establishment of an aggressive Renewables
Portfolio Standard (RPS). As the result of a series of legislative actions beginning in
2002, California now provides nearly 20% of its electricity from renewable resources,
with mandatory targets to reach a 33% penetration level by the year 2020. Admirable
as these efforts may be, they have been imposed on an electricity grid and an energy
sector paradigm not accustomed to the difficulties of matching intermittent renewable
4

energy generation with inelastic electricity demand. As outlined in detail later in this
report, the California ISO has identified several serious threats to grid stability and
reliability that could develop as an increasing portion of our energy is supplied by
intermittent RES. Basically, the output of renewable electricity resources like solar
panels and wind turbines is intermittent and dependent upon natural cycles, while the
electricity use habits of consumers are dictated more closely by their daily schedules.
This means that while state policy continues to encourage massive amounts of private
investment in newer and bigger renewable energy generation facilities it may become
difficult to efficiently integrate into the grid all of the resulting renewable energy, due to
an inability to store it until it is needed for use by consumers. In accordance with these
issues, the state of California has instituted a series of regulatory and policy
instruments intended to ensure that adequate electricity storage capacity is developed
within the power grid over coming years.
On October 1st, 2013, a mandate was adopted by the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) requiring that 1.325 GW of energy storage capability be installed
on the California electricity grid by 2024, through the actions of the state’s three
investor-owned utilities. While this is a bold first step towards mandated energy storage
in the United States, it may be only the beginning for an energy storage industry in this
state. It has been well established that energy storage would prove to be a useful asset
on the California electrical grid, but the development of storage capacity past the
requirements of the mandate will depend upon whether storage can be made costeffective. Much of the value that storage creates is a public good: many storage
applications allow the grid to operate more efficiently as a whole, but not necessarily in
a way that can be monetized by any particular party. As a public good, these systemic
benefits of storage capacity will be supplied sub-optimally in the absence of
government intervention. The energy storage industry will accordingly be one that is
strongly affected by the tides of change in technology, regulation and economics in the
California energy market. This report will focus primarily on the intersection of the
second two of these factors, largely leaving the technological questions to more wellinformed parties while seeking to establish what regulatory and economic
considerations might be undertaken to ensure that the road to deployment of
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appropriate energy storage systems is made as clear as possible so that this
technology can reach the socially efficient level on the California electricity grid.
Chapter 2 will assess the nature of the California electricity grid itself as the
landscape upon which AB 2514 has been imposed. Electricity market institutions such
as the system operator, energy exchange platform and utilities will be examined by
virtue of their relationship to energy storage on the CA grid. An explanation of the
issues posed by RES that necessitate the establishment of storage capability on the
grid will be accompanied by an examination of the role each of these institutions will
have to play in doing so.
Chapter 3 will present an overview of energy storage as a concept, beginning
with an introduction to key technologies but ultimately taking an application-specific
approach to what storage technologies may be deployed, as well as where on the grid
and for what purpose. This chapter will look at the opportunities that exist for the
owners, operators and investors in storage technologies to monetize and recover the
value that their investments create for the electricity grid and society as a whole, and
will also explore areas where future value propositions may be created. Regulatory
developments relevant to this issue will be introduced and examined by virtue of their
potential to create a tangible marketplace for ESS technologies that provide many
valuable services not recognized by the current regulatory paradigm and consequent
market structure of modern electricity markets.
Chapter 4 will look towards the future of the California electricity grid and
envision the impacts that the development of different types of storage technologies
may have on the evolution of the way electricity is used and provided in California.
Several scenarios will be developed to predict how technological change, regulatory
measures, and general economic incentives may affect the nature and distribution of
ESS that are deployed on the California electricity grid.
Chapter 5 will assess the scenarios created and conduct an analysis of how the
development of an energy storage industry in California could provide value in
addressing the grid issues associated with the state’s ambitious renewable energy
6

goals. From this analysis, a conclusion will be drawn about how storage could best be
cost-effectively used to create a more sustainable and reliable electricity grid for the
state of California, and general policy recommendations will be made towards this end.
It is the aim of this report not to promote a specific technology or even an energy
storage industry as a whole, but rather to shed some light on the effects that the
development of such an industry could have on the California electricity market and the
energy use paradigm that governs modern electricity grids worldwide. With the
adoption of AB 2514, a grand experiment was set in motion that will benefit the entire
world as California tests the uncharted technological, regulatory and economic
territories of grid-scale energy storage capacity. It is a time of change in the electricity
industry, and energy storage is a potentially transformative technology that could very
well enable the shattering of an energy use paradigm that has held the world captive to
fossil fuels for over a century.
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Chapter 2: The California Electricity Market
2.1 Market Structure
Like the market for any good, the California electricity market exists fundamentally for
the purpose of matching supply with demand. In most markets the laws of economics
suffice to balance these two amounts, albeit with periods of scarcity and
overabundance. The market for electricity differs in this characteristic due to the lack of
storage capability – there are no “electricity warehouses”- and the ability to
instantaneously match supply and demand is crucial. Failure to do so may result in
planned or unplanned blackouts, or, in the extreme, damage to user equipment (AUS
Consultants) or to the electricity grid itself. To borrow a metaphor from Peter FoxPenner’s book Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, and the Future of
Electric Utilities, it is helpful to think of the electricity grid as a network of ponds that are
all connected by channels of varying size. When electricity is generated in one area, it
is analogous to releasing an amount of water into one of the ponds, with the excess
water spreading through the network of channels as the water level is equalized across
the system. Electricity consumers can be thought of as pipes drawing water from each
of the ponds, each with a level of flow that fluctuates with energy use. The amount of
water entering and exiting the network of ponds must be matched on a second-tosecond basis or the water level will drop too low or overflow, interfering with the ability
of the network to provide a reliable supply. Much of the complexity of the California
electricity market is designated to simply matching supply and demand (in as socially
efficient a manner as possible), which requires the cooperation of a variety of publicly
and privately coordinated institutions.
Both the federal government and state governments are intimately involved in
electricity regulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates
wholesale electricity transactions - transactions in which the purchaser does not “use”
the electricity but instead sells the electricity to another party. In the 1980s, the FERC
adopted “market-based” regulation of electricity transactions in wholesale markets. It is
this market-based regulation that constitutes the “deregulation” of all wholesale power
markets in the U.S. On the other hand, state regulatory commissions regulate retail
electricity transactions. Any transaction in which the purchaser is an end-user of the
8

electricity is a retail transaction. About half the states in the U.S. have “deregulated”
retail electricity markets by adopting some form of “retail competition” in which
consumers can choose to purchase their electricity from various competitive retail
providers. In most of these states, if a consumer chooses not to purchase power from a
competitive retail supplier, the local utility is still required to provide consumers with
electricity on a “default basis”, at prices regulated by the state utility commission.
California electricity markets are “deregulated” at both the wholesale and retail
levels. Wholesale prices are determined in competitive markets subject to FERC
market-based price regulation. Retail prices charged consumers by public utilities are
subject to regulation by the CPUC, while the retail prices charged consumers by
competitive retailers are unregulated. To enhance wholesale competition as a
foundation for introducing retail competition, in 1996 the California legislature
authorized two public-benefit, non-profit market institutions known as the California
Power Exchange (CalPX) and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO).
While it operated, the CalPX operated certain day-ahead and hour-ahead electricity
markets. However, the CalPX was disbanded during the 2000-2001 California Power
Crisis and its market-operating functions were taken over by the CAISO.
Today, the CAISO operates 24 hourly auction-based day-ahead markets as well
as an hour-ahead day-of market that allows wholesale suppliers and purchasers of
electricity to transact at market-clearing prices and quantities in each “zone” of the
market (Kritikson, 2000). These CAISO auctions result in mutual financial commitments
between buyers and sellers, which are the main determinants of the dispatch of
generation by the CAISO. The CAISO also purchases certain “ancillary services” (AS)
on a day-ahead and longer-term basis to assist it in operating the grid reliably.
Suppliers in these AS markets agree to allow the CAISO to order them to undertake
certain actions on a real-time basis for grid-balancing purposes. These adjustments are
traditionally made through orders to dispatch traditional, fossil fuel-powered generation
plants with the ability to quickly ramp production up and down.
Many of these plants are quick-start, simple-cycle gas turbine “peaking” plants.
In the absence of electricity storage, additional plants such as these would likely have
9

to be built to enable the integration of large amounts of additional intermittent
renewable generation. Finally, the CAISO attempts to balance the system on a
moment-to-moment basis by operating 10-minute-ahead “real-time” markets during the
day of actual grid operation. The real-time market is used to make last minute
adjustments by a largely computerized system that monitors energy imbalances on the
grid (Kritikson, 2000). Through these mechanisms, the CAISO balances the needs of
around 30 million electricity users with the production capabilities of 671 power plants
along 25,865 miles of transmission lines (Trabish, 2012), though an equally important
role is played by electric utilities.

2.2 Utilities
Electric power utilities typically own and operate the distribution systems used to
interconnect retail electricity consumers to the grid at large. Providing this delivery
service necessarily places them in a commercial relationship with retail customers.
These utilities also are the exclusive providers of electric energy to retail customers
except in those states that have adopted retail competition. Even in these states,
utilities typically serve a large portion of the retail energy market. In the early days of
electric power, electric utilities were vertically integrated, regionally regulated monopoly
companies that performed all retail services from the installation of light bulbs for
customers to the generation and distribution of the electricity to power them (FoxPenner, 2010). The role of utilities has evolved significantly since those early days,
however, and even more extremely in California since the 1996 passage of AB 1890
and the consequent deregulation of the California electricity industry. Regulations
prompting utility divestment of generation capacity (with some exceptions) have
caused utilities to adopt a role more oriented toward electricity distribution and,
recently, the provision of “energy services”, including energy efficiency measures and
storage capacity.
The three investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that serve California - Pacific Gas and
Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E)
– own 70% of the California transmission system, while publicly-owned utilities (POUs)
and other public agencies own the remaining 30% (Independent Energy Producers
Association, n.d.). All electricity that is consumed in the state of California, even the
10

electricity provided by competitive retailers, passes through these lines, which means
that utilities are uniquely poised to monitor energy use and gather relevant data, a
service that will prove essential to a state with the goal of pursuing a more efficient and
sustainable electricity grid. The problem is that utilities’ profits have traditionally been
based on the “natural monopoly” they have over transmission capability and derived
from volumetric electricity sales, providing an incentive to increase “throughput” of
electricity through their wires even when doing so is perverse to the goal of energy
efficiency (Kushler et al., 2006). This issue was confronted by California in the early
1980s through the “decoupling” of utility profits from volumetric energy sales, which
were replaced through the periodic regulatory setting of a pre-determined revenue
requirement. Moreover, to give utilities an affirmative incentive to encourage customers
to adopt energy efficiency measures, they have been given performance-based
rewards for progress towards energy efficiency goals (Kushler et al., 2006). Through
such economic incentives, alongside the implementation of legislative mandates, the
state of California aims to enlist utilities as major players in the campaign for a
sustainable electricity market. Indeed, it should be the hope of utilities that they are
included in the state’s plan for the future, because as providers of a service (energy),
they must respond to the changing demands of the society they serve. California no
longer wants just cheap energy, but clean, reliable and efficient energy as well.
This trend is not isolated to California but is in fact indicative of a global shift in
the utility industry. A recognition of the true costs of traditional electricity production
combined with the advent of new, cleaner energy technologies have enabled a new
energy use paradigm, in which utilities and other Load Serving Entities are expected
not just to provide cheap electricity. Combined, these changes to the energy sector
constitute not just a challenge to utility companies, but an existential threat that will
require utilities to adapt or face becoming obsolete. The traditional profit streams of
utilities are in decline as an increasing amount of emphasis is placed on efficiency over
cheap energy. For evidence of this we can look to Europe, where renewables have
already achieved market penetration levels comparable to those that California will
soon reach, causing an “existential crisis” for utilities (The Economist, 2013). Figure 1
demonstrates how the earnings before tax & interest (EBIT) for European utility
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countries has declined from 2011 to 2012, and projects further decline in earnings from
conventional generation in particular, as the year 2020 approaches.
Figure 1: Declining value creation potential from conventional generation, the core
profit pool in the European Utility Industry (2012).
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In a move indicative of the change afoot in the utility industry, Germany’s
second largest electric utility, RWE, recently announced plans to transform its business
model, reinventing itself as a “renewable services provider” (Lacey, 2013). The
company’s existential crisis came about as a result of plummeting profits, with
recurrent net income falling by fully one third since 2010 (The Economist, 2013).
Renewable energy and the changes to the electricity grid that will accompany them
pose a significant threat to the conventional value streams of these companies, but at
the same time present an opportunity for forward-looking industry players to benefit
from capturing new profit opportunities as they come to exist. Energy storage is one
sector in which utilities are currently evaluating the prospects for positive investment,
and a promising one at that. A recent survey of 54 utility executives from 13 countries
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across the globe found that although 23% saw energy storage as a potential threat to
profits, 29% identified energy storage systems (ESS) as a development with the
potential for revenue upside (St. John, 2013). Given their predominant position in the
energy sector, it will be important that utilities see the potential value of energy storage
and are made able to capitalize upon this value through proper regulatory measures.

2.3 Integration of Renewable Energy Resources
The California electricity market has been in the spotlight many times, but most
recently much attention has been directed toward the state’s Renewable Portfolio
Standard, which currently mandates that by December 31st, 2020, one third of all
energy retail sales in the state must be derived from renewable sources. This is a
target that will likely increase, as the recently passed Assembly Bill (AB) 327
authorized the CPUC to establish even higher procurement goals for the future
(DSIRE, 2013). The 2003 Energy Action Plan adopted by the CA energy agencies
further strengthens the state’s support for renewables by mandating a “loading order”
that must be implemented by LSEs when participating in CAISO auctions, wherein
cost-effective energy efficiency strategies must be the first method employed in
meeting electricity demand, followed second by cost-effective renewable energy
generations. Only after these two resources are fully utilized may conventional energy
sources be employed in meeting load (Trabish, 2013).
This trend towards higher levels of electricity market penetration by renewable
energy sources is consistent with the state’s ultimate goal of carbon dioxide emissions
reductions to 80% below 1990 levels by the year 2050 (Williams et al., 2012). It is also
a trend that could threaten the reliability of the grid and the stability of electricity prices,
necessitating a variety of technological and regulatory responses of which storage is
one. The closure of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station will also have a
significant impact on the availability of consistent, clean energy and further necessitate
the implementation of load balancing and capacity resources such as storage on the
California grid (Olson, 2013).
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Load Shifting
Given the intermittent nature of renewable energy generation, there has been
considerable discussion of the roles that energy storage could play in helping to
“smooth” the supply of electricity from such sources. Indeed, this has been the most
highly publicized and politicized argument in support of energy storage deployment in
California, and will ultimately prove to be a technologically necessary one should
intermittent RES achieve a high enough level of market penetration. Figure 2 displays
the average hourly output from renewable energy sources in California over the course
of a day. It can be seen how, when averaged over the course of a year, renewable
energy generation follows a general pattern that declines during daytime hours as wind
facilities, which produce the majority of their energy during nighttime hours, decline in
output. It can be seen that as of 2012, wind and solar energy actually complement
each other fairly well, with one balancing the output of the other to create an average
net load that is fairly consistent on an hourly basis and that only dips by a maximum of
8000 megawatts (MW) over the course of the day. This could easily change as either
solar or wind energy overtakes the other as the dominant RES on the California
electricity grid.
Figure 2: Average hourly output of Wind and Solar PV energy resources for 2012.

Source: CAISO website.
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When discussed in reference to its role on the grid, renewable energy
generation is treated as “negative load” rather than conventional generation due to
its unpredictability and variability. This “negative load” allows the CAISO to lower
the amount of traditional generation plants it dispatches during the day, when
electricity demand is low and the amount of energy available from solar RES is
high. A problem arises, however, when electricity demand skyrockets around 4 PM
with people returning home from work and consuming energy, even as solar PV
production is in decline and wind energy has not yet begun to supply much energy.
Figure 3 was created by the CAISO to demonstrate the reality of this challenge and
has been designated the “duck graph”. It illustrates the predicted net load for each
hour of a typical day in March, for each year through 2020.
Figure 3: The Duck Graph

Source: CA ISO, 2013b.
The actual profiles of this day in March during 2012 and 2013 are not overly
alarming, but the change seen between the net load profiles of these two years
(created from real data, not projections) is more of a cause for concern. Even over the
course of one year the required “ramping” capability – the ability to bring new sources
of generation online quickly to meet net load – required to address this late-afternoon
15

net load swing nearly doubles from around 3,000 MW to almost 6,000. As is evident
from the projections of future years in the graph, a considerable and increasing amount
of strain will be placed on the grid operator to be able to address this swing in net load
as the amount of energy produced by renewable energy sources grows. The current
“duck graph” projections end with a need for 13,000 MW in around 3 hours, but the
“neck” of the duck will only continue to grow with increasing penetration of renewables.
In the years after 2020 we could be looking at a “giraffe” graph if steps are not taken to
address this issue.
The reason for the immense swing illustrated in the duck graph is that
unpredictable, intermittent resources have a very low “capacity value”, which is one of
two main metrics that are used to assess the grid benefits of a generation facility. The
other main metric, “energy value”, refers to the amount of energy that a facility will be
able to supply to the grid at any given time, while the “capacity value” refers specifically
to the amount of power a generation facility can reliably provide the grid at hours of
peak demand. The reason “capacity value” is such an important metric is because it
measures not only the amount of a facility’s energy that will be able to be sold at peak
energy prices, but also because a high capacity value means that a generation facility
has the capability of deferring investment of other forms of capacity i.e. traditional
peaking plants.
A recent case study of California found that both wind and solar PV facilities
saw their incremental capacity value decline significantly as renewable penetration
levels increased, with the capacity value of additional solar PV decreasing by fully two
thirds as the penetration of that technology approached 10% (Mills, 2013). The
capacity value of wind is low even at low penetration levels due to the non-coincidence
of wind energy generation with demand in that state of CA, but still declines by nearly
50% as wind approached a 10% market penetration level. The upshot of all of this is
that with increasing levels of intermittent renewable generation that is non-coincident
with peak demand in the state of CA, an increasing number of expensive, fossil fuel
powered peaking plants will need to be constructed in the absence of energy storage.
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ESS present a compelling solution to this problem due to several unique
characteristics that make them far more effective than peaking plants in addressing
these grid issues. The first and most basic feature that differentiates energy storage is
its ability to act as both “load” and “generation” on the grid – at any given time, many
ESS can either draw energy from, or provide energy to, the grid. This makes them
economically compelling as a complement to renewable energy sources because they
can absorb the excess or low-price energy created by VRES at off-peak hours, and
then use that energy when the grid has higher levels of demand, either selling it back
to the grid at higher prices or allowing ESS owners to avoid the need to purchase highpriced energy, opting to draw their energy from the ESS instead of the grid. Essentially,
pairing intermittent RES with energy storage restores their capacity value.
Though electricity consumers engaging in such arbitrage would be doing so for
their own good, there is a welfare effect associated with such behavior in electricity
markets that comes in the form of lower electricity prices for all grid-connected
consumers (Sioshansi, 2010). This is due largely to the elimination of the system need
for expensive peaking plants and their high marginal cost energy as electricity demand
that would typically prompt grid operators to bring peaking plants online is shifted to offpeak hours. This concept, known as Permanent Load Shifting (PLS), is illustrated in
Figure 4 on the following page with a simplified example illustrating a wind-powered
RES that overproduces during the day. This figure is only illustrative, and is not
intended to serve as a representation of actual data.
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Figure 4: Supply Shifting/Load Balancing Capabilities of Storage

Source: Denholm, 2010.
In this graph of a hypothetical electrical system with high penetration of
intermittent wind generation, it can be seen that surplus wind energy is being
produced between hours 12 and 18, when net load decreases due to dwindling
electricity demand. Placing ESS on the grid would open up the possibility of
“absorbing” this excess energy and using it to offset the need for additional
generation capacity, in the form of flexible thermal generation (FTG), later in the
day. In assessing which grid assets to employ in meeting peak load, the industry
typically evaluates alternate strategies using Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE),
which ranks technologies by their cost per unit of energy provided over an entire
lifecycle, as a metric. From this point of view, this practice makes sense only if the
cost of installing sufficient ESS to achieve this is less than the combined cost of
installing and operating FTG, which would be largely dependent on natural gas
prices and carbon prices. In light of CA’s aggressive RPS and the massive social
need to reduce carbon emissions, however, another factor needs to be taken into
account; the potential curtailment of RES. Without storage, this “surplus” wind
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energy would not even be produced, as intermittent RES would be ordered to
curtail their generation so as not to overload the grid with too much electricity.

Renewables Integration
Even today on the CA electricity grid, energy that could be produced at an
incredibly low marginal economic and social cost is turned down due to the fact that
basically, the grid cannot absorb it. The Tehachapi region in CA is one area where
the utility operating the wind energy generation facility has to practice curtailment
around 6-8% of the time due to congestion of local transmission lines (Fink et al.,
2009). Curtailment of RES remains an exception on today’s electricity grid, but it
has been demonstrated that curtailment levels increase in a non–linear fashion with
increasing penetration of intermittent RES, as shown by Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Simulated Curtailment of Variable Generation as a Function of Storage
in ERCOT.

Source: Denholm, 2012.
In this simulation of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) grid,
significant curtailment does not begin until around 50% of the energy used by the grid
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is produced from wind and solar generation, but increases very steeply after that point
without storage capacity. This causes the LCOE of RES to increase equally quickly,
due to the fact that LCOE is inversely proportional to capacity factor in a generation
facility with zero marginal operational costs (Denholm, 2012). This is consistent with
findings that on the CA electricity grid, solar PV and concentrated solar power (CSP)
facilities would experience substantially greater curtailment without storage capabilities
than with them as penetration levels approach 15-20% for each technology (Mills,
2013). It is important to note that while significant curtailment does not begin until fairly
high levels of penetration are reached, without ESS the diminution of the value of RES
energy begins far earlier than curtailment because a portion of the energy they produce
must be sold during low-price periods.
For CSP in particular, it was found that while without storage, 7% and 48% of
energy produced at these penetration levels would have to be curtailed or sold at low
prices, respectively, the ability to store this energy for 6 hours would essentially
mitigate curtailment while keeping energy sold at low prices below 2% (Mills, 2013).
This is an especially promising value proposition because CSP, which operates by
harnessing solar heat to create steam, is naturally a very good candidate for the
installation of a thermal energy storage (TES) system. TES has the potential to make
CSP more dispatchable an energy resource than either wind or solar PV, which would
significantly raise its capacity value over that of other intermittent RES (Madaeni et al.,
2011).

Ancillary Services
The final, and most pressing issue that an RPS poses to the California electricity grid is
an increase in short-term variability of electricity output with increasingly intermittent
RES. While the average, long term patterns that VRES follow (see Figure 2) are fairly
predictable, the variability of these resources on a daily, hourly, and even second to
second basis can be extreme. Figure 6 on the following page illustrates the real-time
variability seen in the output of a solar PV facility in Arizona.
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Figure 6: Real Time Variability in output of Solar Electricity Generation Facility in
Arizona

Source: Apt & Curtright, 2008
Although you can see that the general outline of the output from this one day at
a solar generation facility in Arizona follows a similar shape as the annual averages
displayed in Figure 6, it can also be seen that the actual real-time output of the facility
can vary from peak to nearly zero in a matter of minutes or less. As an increasingly
large percentage of our electricity is derived from RES this creates a need to obtain
“flexible resources”– those that can switch very quickly from acting as a neutral or even
positive load on the grid to acting as a supplier of energy– to account for this problem.
To return to the pond analogy, these are the resources that allow the system operator
to keep the “water level” even on a second-to-second basis, despite potentially large
fluctuations in the real-time inputs to the system. A 2010 California Energy Commission
study found that the 33% penetration level targeted by 2020 could cause “extreme”
degradation of the performance of the CA electricity grid without investing in mitigation
technologies such as flexible resources (KEMA, 2010).
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Many energy storage technologies fit this description, both for their ability to
both withdraw and supply energy to the grid, effectively doubling their regulation
capabilities (Lin, 2011), and for their comparative advantage in speed – most batteries
can provide instantaneous power to the grid at speeds on the order of a few
milliseconds (Divya & Østergaard, 2009). There already exists a commercial market for
such services – known as the Ancillary Services (AS) market in California. As our
energy sources become increasingly intermittent, these markets will only expand as a
reflection of the grid’s need for load balancing resources; AS markets will be discussed
in detail in section 3.4.
In sum, an increasing level of RES on the California grid presents a range of
issues to grid operators, utilities, and ultimately anyone who relies on the CA electricity
grid. Some of these concerns are more immediate than others. Lower-cost substitutes
for ESS may exist up to a certain point of market penetration, but although studies
have found that with “low levels of VRES [variable renewable energy sources]
penetration in a strong grid, electricity storage is not crucial” (Beaudin et al., 2010),
they have also concluded that storage becomes increasingly important for grid stability
as RES levels increase. As an expert contact on SoCal Edison’s special projects
management team put it, ESS application may not be essential even at the 33%
market penetration level targeted by the RPS, but it will become increasingly important
and feasible as penetration levels reach 40-50%, and “that is the direction the state is
heading” (SoCal Edison, Personal communication, October 2013).
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Chapter 3: Energy Storage
The previous chapter entailed a description of the technical, regulatory and economic
landscape of the California electricity market into which energy storage technologies
will be propelled by Assembly Bill 2514. More specifically, AB 2514 will promote the
deployment of “energy storage systems” (ESS), defined as “commercially available
technology that is capable of absorbing energy, storing it for a period of time, and
thereafter dispatching the energy” (AB 2514). The bill, passed in 2010, also authorized
the California Public Utilities Commission to begin proceedings towards establishing an
acceptable target for the procurement of such technologies by the state’s IOUs. This
broad definition of ESS was intended to “embrace a mix of ownership models and
contribute to a diverse portfolio that can encourage competition, innovation,
partnerships, and affordability” (CPUC, 2013).

3.1 Assembly Bill 2514
On October 17, 2013 the CPUC established a procurement goal of 1.325 GW by the
year 2020 for the three IOUs, further directing Community Choice Aggregators and
Electric Service Providers (ESPs - i.e., competitive retailers) to acquire the equivalent
of 1% of their generation by the same date. Table 1 on the following page outlines the
procurement goals set for IOUs, which shares the same basic structure as the
regulations currently in development that will guide procurement for publicly owned
utilities (POUs). In the relevant press release, the CPUC established three main goals
as underlying their decision to incentivize the development of energy storage capacity
in California (CPUC, 2013):
1) Optimization of the grid, including peak reduction, contribution to reliability needs, or
deferment of transmission and distribution upgrade investments
2) Integration of renewable energy
3) Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050,
per California’s goals
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Table 1: California ISO Energy Storage Procurement Goals, by MW of Capacity.
Year

2014

2016

2018

2020 Total

Transmission

50

65

85

110

310

Distribution

30

40

50

65

185

Customer

10

15

25

35

85

90

120

160

210

580

Transmission

50

65

85

110

310

Distribution

30

40

50

65

185

Customer

10

15

25

35

85

Subtotal PG&E

90

120

160

210

580

10

15

22

33

80

Distribution

7

10

15

23

55

Customer

3

5

8

14

30

20

30

45

70

165

200

270

365

490

1,325

Southern California
Edison

Subtotal
SCE
Pacific Gas and
Electric

San Diego Gas &
Electric
Transmission

Subtotal SDG&E
Total
All 3 utilities

Data from California Public Utilities Commission. 2013

Each of these three goals also identifies a broad category of value for any ESS that
can address these present and future grid adaptation issues.
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The mandate allows for flexibility in that an IOU may defer up to 80% of target
storage capacity to a later installment period, if they demonstrate that the mandated
amount is not operationally or economically viable for them during the stated period.
This will be helpful to IOUs in allowing them to procure storage capacity cost-effectively
as it becomes technologically available, but the flexibility is limited. The bill also
includes an absolute installation deadline of 2024, meaning that by this year there will
be fully 1.325 GW of installed energy storage capacity on the California electricity grid.
This is an exciting development given the potential for energy storage to be a “game
changer” for the California electricity grid, yet AB 2514 will be only the beginning for the
energy storage industry in this state.
The flexibility of the mandate, along with its emphasis on cost-effectiveness,
means that despite the hard procurement goals, even under the mandate energy
storage will only be deployed where the technology is an economically viable choice.
For example, in deploying their portion of the ESS technology under the mandate,
SoCal Edison has stated that they will use an application-specific approach in which
they identify the most promising value streams for storage and match these niche
applications with the most cost-effective, appropriate ESS technology (Rittershausen
and McDonaugh, 2011). What this means is that energy storage regulation and
deployment should be viewed as a way to fulfill a need of the electricity grid, rather
than as a means of promoting a certain technology. If alternative means of addressing
these issues are more cost-effective, they should be deployed before ESS.

3.2 Application Categories
Section 2.3 identified several significant challenges that will confront the CA electricity
grid in coming years, that energy storage has the potential to address. Some of these
categories were permanent load shifting, the need for more flexible resources with
quick ramping capabilities, and the goal of achieving the state’s RPS and GHG
emissions goals as efficiently as possible. Most uses of ESS fall into one of these
broad categories, but there are several other distinctions that are important to
recognize regarding the deployment and use of ESS, as they will largely impact the

25

ability of ESS to be properly remunerated and will have implications for the structural
future of CA’s electricity grid.
System Security Vs. System Adequacy
Most of the value to be derived from energy storage technologies is a result of their
ability to make the electricity grid more flexible in the face of a shifting regulatory and
technological environment, thereby increasing the overall reliability of the grid. The
National Energy Research Council (NERC) has defined system reliability as “the
degree to which the performance of the elements of the technical system results in
power being delivered to consumers within accepted standards and in the amount
desired", and identified two distinguishable aspects of grid reliability. These are system
security, which relates to the ability of the system to withstand contingencies, and
adequacy, which refers to the ability of grid operators to consistently meet the
aggregate power and electricity demand of all consumers (Oren, 2005).
Storage technologies are often classified by energy capacity and power
capacity, and these characteristics will play a large part in determining which of the two
grid reliability categories a technology may prove useful for at the grid scale. Figure 7
on the following page provides a comparison of the different extant storage
technologies by rated power and discharge time at that power level, as well as
providing some examples of use categories that technologies with certain
characteristics might fulfill, along the top of the graph. Technologies that lie near the
bottom of the graph are known as Limited Energy Storage Resources (LESR) as they
can provide power at their rated capacity for only a short amount of time, such as
seconds or minutes at most. LESRs such as flywheels and certain batteries are more
applicable to the provision of grid security, and are valued mainly for their ability to
provide ancillary services. The technologies listed farther up the graph, notably CAES,
Flow Batteries and Metal-Air Batteries, have longer charge and discharge cycles and
are able to provide electricity to the grid for longer periods of time, but often at the cost
of flexibility. These resources provide adequacy to the grid by increasing the capacity
value of RES, and are valued primarily for their ability to permanently shift broader,
more predictable energy usage patterns and allow ESS owners to take advantage of
temporal differentiation in electricity prices.
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Figure 7: Power and Energy Capacities of ESS Technologies, with Applications.

Source: <www.energystorage.org>
Security and adequacy are two distinct grid characteristics that require the
implementation of correspondingly distinct technologies to achieve. Both of these are
services that will be essential to the CAISO and the CA electricity grid in general as our
electricity is obtained from increasingly intermittent resources like wind and solar
generation facilities.
Locations within the Grid
Another important classification category, and one that the CPUC in fact identified and
accounted for in their mandate, is the location of storage capacity on the grid. The
three categories identified by the CPUC are transmission-connected, distributionconnected and storage that is located with end-users; this report will add a fourth
category, that of generation-owned and sited (this falls under transmission-connected
in the mandate, but the distinction is significant enough to warrant a fourth category).
Although the CPUC has established targets for each category provided for in AB 2514
(see Table 1), the ultimate location and ownership of energy storage facilities beyond
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the mandate will be determined more significantly by the characteristics of the
technologies that become competitive as the energy storage industry grows and the
influence of regulation. Certain operational features of successful technologies,
including but not limited to safety, durability and energy capacity, will also have a
strong influence on the outcomes of this category. This category is especially intriguing
because the location of storage, along with who owns and operates it, will play a major
role in determining whether energy storage technology is deployed as just another part
of a centralized, utility owned electricity grid, or as a truly disruptive technology that
challenges the current energy use paradigm.
Use Category
There are a variety of recognized value propositions for electricity grid services that
storage can fulfill. Which specific application a facility will be applied to will depend
largely on the previous two categories. The likely uses of storage, by location along the
grid, are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Likely Use Categories of Storage, by Location.
Adequacy/Capacity

Security/Flexibility

Transmission

Line and Transformer Deferral, Load Shifting

Stability, Ancillary Services

and Distribution

(Peaking Plant Deferral, Renewable Penetration)

(Frequency Regulation, Spinning
Reserve)

End-Use

Load Shifting/Peak Load Reduction, Energy

Power Quality/Reliability,

Arbitrage

Distributed Generation & Smart
Grid Support Reserves

Generation

Increased Value of Generation/ MWh

Voltage/Frequency Regulation.

(Dispatchability), Spinning Reserve, Capacity
Deferral, Load Balancing,

The use cases listed here are the most potentially valuable discrete value
streams of an ESS, and therefore the most likely uses of an energy storage system
should it be introduced to the grid under the ownership structure of a party looking to
maximize profit. Many of the benefits of energy storage are the most valuable when
provided to the electricity grid as a whole (Denholm, 2012), and Section 3.5 will
examine these systemic effects of storage. These use cases were developed
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considering technical feasibility, the accessibility of the relevant markets to certain
parties, and the incentive structures guiding players at various locations on the grid.
The realization of these use cases depends upon, in addition to the two variables listed
here, ownership category (which will influence the operational incentives of any given
ESS) and the market avenues that are created for proper remuneration of each use.
These will be examined in Section 3.4.

3.3 Technology
It is important to this analysis to conduct a review of the state of energy storage
technologies and their attributes, in order to more effectively match them with
appropriate applications on the grid. Storage technologies can be implemented at three
basic levels: bulk storage, grid-scale storage and distributed energy storage (DES).
These can be generally classified as facilities that provide storage at the Gigawatt
(GW), Megawatt (MW), and Kilowatt (kW) scale. This report will focus on grid-scale
technologies, but will also review the potential for bulk storage as well as for the
aggregation of large amounts of distributed end-use storage.
The only form of storage with any prominence in electricity grids as they
currently exist is bulk storage, in the form of pumped hydroelectric storage (PHS). The
120 GW of PHS that is currently installed accounts for 97% of global installed energy
storage capacity, and is equivalent to approximately 3% of the world's total installed
generation capacity (Beaudin et al., 2010). This report will avoid PHS, both because it
is largely excluded from the counting towards procurement targets under the AB 2514
mandate, and due to the fact that mounting concerns over the environmental impact of
reservoirs may limit the feasibility of such projects in the future (Yang & Jackson,
2011), especially in the state of California.
Energy storage systems comprise a wide range of technologies with many
different characteristics. These subtleties can make a “uniform comparison of storage
technologies (for example on a $/kW or $/kWh basis) difficult and often of limited use”
(Sioshansi et al., 2012). For this reason I will discuss the likely technologies in context,
as opposed to attempting to judge them across one unilateral criteria. There are
numerous functional distinctions that can be drawn for energy storage technologies.
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Several of those most important in determining the nature and impact of storage
deployment in the state of California will be employed in this report. The following is a
brief review of four of the most promising technologies, identified in the California
Senate’s analysis of AB 2514 as likely to have an impact on the electricity grid as a
result of their ability to provide valuable services to the grid (Senate Rules Committee,
2010). The basic metrics most relevant to this analysis have been identified for each
technology, while the advantages and disadvantages of each technology have been
identified. The primary metrics identified include:
Ramping: The amount of time that an ESS takes to go from zero power output
to full power output. Quick ramping is the main feature of a “flexible” system and has
many advantages over traditional generation.
Duration: How long an ESS can provide power at its rated capacity. This will
determine whether an ESS is more relevant to grid capacity or security.
Efficiency: Indicates the energy loss involved with electricity conversion into
and back from each ESS. Will be especially important for technologies attempting to
take advantage of price differentials.
Longevity: The length of an ESS life cycle has been identified as having
important implications for both its economic (CPUC, 2010) and its energetic (Bahnard
et al., 2013) justifications. A longer life cycle means a more useful technology.
Cost/kWh: This metric looks at the LCOE of energy an ESS can provide.
Although this is not necessarily the best measure of life time cost for ESS, which often
concentrate on power, rather than energy, capacity, it is important because it is the
metric commonly used in the energy industry and is the one that will be used to
compare ESS will against other grid assets.
Several other important, but harder to quantify for inclusion in the table, considerations
looked at include safety and locational restrictions such as energy density –
technologies that require a large land area to store energy will be at a disadvantage to
technologies that can do so in a compact way, especially for uses nearer to end-users.
See Appendix 2 for a more complete listing of extant storage technologies and their
metrics.
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Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) Systems
CAES systems employ off-peak power to pump air into a container, typically an
underground salt cavern or similar geologic formation, where it is stored as potential
energy until needed. When excess power is needed for the grid at peak hours the air is
released and heated, passing through the turbine of an engine that converts the energy
back to electricity for use on the grid (Chen et al., 2013). These systems can go from
zero to full capacity of power output in 5-12 minutes - a quicker ramp rate than
traditional gas-fired peaking plants – and typically have a high energy capacity, making
them good candidates for meeting peak load. CAES also have large energy capacity
and can provide energy to the grid for extended durations, making it a good option for
PLS as well. These systems are somewhat limited in that they need to be placed in a
location with a suitable area for placing the compressed air (such as old mine shafts)
and also must have access to natural gas pipelines and electricity transmission.
Advantages: Economy of scale is created allowing low capital costs /kWh.
Disadvantages: Low energy density for aboveground CAES. Below-ground CAES
require specific geographical features.
Ramping

Duration

Efficiency

Longevity

Cost ($/kWh)

5-12 minutes.

8-20 hours.

60-80%

>13,000

60-125

Flywheel Energy Storage (FES)
Flywheels are an LESR that convert electricity to maintainable kinetic energy to allow
for conversion back to electricity when needed at peak hours. These systems consist
of disks rotating on ball bearings, and a generator that can convert the angular
momentum of the desks into electricity and back. FES can store energy at relatively
high efficiency for short periods of time, but are also subject to high rates of selfdischarge due to frictional losses over longer periods (Rastler, 2010).
Advantages: High efficiency, very responsive/flexible resource. Long lifecycle equates
to lower capital costs per kW provided.
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Disadvantages: Low energy density, inability to provide power for long durations. Very
high initial capital costs.
Ramping

Duration

Efficiency

Longevity

Cost/kWh

<4 milliseconds

1 hour or less.

93%

>100,000

7800-8800

Thermal Energy Storage (TES)
TES systems use off-peak energy to create thermal energy that is then stored in a
medium until it can be used either as thermal energy or for conversion back to
electricity. These systems have the advantages of simplicity, safety and the ability to
alter the air conditioning patterns of buildings, which the CPUC estimates account for
more than 40-50% of a buildings' peak electricity demand on hot days ("Ice Bear
Energy Storage System"). One of the most promising TES systems employs air
conditioning systems that create large amounts of ice during the middle of the night, a
period of very low electricity demand, and then use this ice to cool entire buildings
during the day without the contemporaneous use of electricity. By taking advantage of
a diurnal effect and creating the coolant (ice) at night when thermal energy efficiency is
high, as opposed to during the day when it is hotter and thermal efficiency is lower,
such systems are able not only to shift a building’s AC energy usage but also to reduce
it, making the “effective efficiency” of these systems as compared to conventional AC
units greater than 1 (Ice Energy).
Advantages: High efficiency, low levelized costs.
Disadvantages: Only applicable for certain uses (primarily AC), does not truly store
electricity but rather shifts usage. Heat loss makes energy storage for periods longer
than daily cycle unfeasible.
Ramping

Duration

Efficiency

Longevity

Cost/kWh

N/A

6 hours

80-99% ( >100% counting

25 years.

Low.

diurnal effect)
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Battery Storage Systems
Battery systems encompass a wide range of technologies that employ an equally wide
variety of chemical processes to maintain electricity within a container for a period of
time, allowing it to be discharged as needed. Other than the use of chemical reactions
to store energy there are few unifying characteristics for these technologies, but
several promising battery technologies are identified here.
Flow Batteries
Flow batteries consist of two tanks of electrolyte solution, each with an electrode and a
circulation system that pushes the electrolytes into a central unit where they are
separated by a membrane. As electrolytes flow through the system they undergo
reduction and oxidation (redox), which allows them to store or provide electricity,
respectively. A recent study showed that flow batteries have a lot of potential to be a
cost-effective storage option, but required “technical validation of performance and
durability at smaller scale” (Rastler et al., 2012).
Advantages: While power capacity is limited by the size of the membrane, the energy
storage capacity (duration at rated power capacity) can be increased by increasing the
volumes of the two electrolytes and is thus theoretically limitless (Leung et al., 2012).
Modularity also means that rated power can also be increased relatively easily,
meaning it may be possible to lower costs by creating economies of scale in the future.
Full discharge possible without damage to system.
Disadvantages: Low energy density, requires large area. High levelized cost for
commercially available technologies. Commercially available technologies undergo
damage with cycling.
Ramping

Duration

Efficiency Longevity

Cost/kWh

Seconds.

4-5 hrs. (for commercially

65-70%

> 500 kWh

available)

Theoretically
limitless, but
currently low.
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Metal-Air Batteries
Metal-Air batteries have several advantages over traditional batteries; their
fundamental ingredients are plentiful and inexpensive, they involve no toxic
components and they have the potential to store energy for comparatively long periods
of time. While not commercially proven, these systems were found by a survey of
emerging storage technologies to have significant potential to provide storage services
with at the “lowest projected [capital] costs” (Rastler et al., 2012). Though this
technology is only on the brink of commercial grid-scale deployment, the following are
the projected characteristics of a new Zinc-Air battery developed by Eos Energy
Storage (Eos Energy Storage, 2013). These batteries are being deployed by utilities
worldwide for the first time during 2014, and as such have not been truly tested, but
these numbers can be considered those of a competitive, and nearly commercially
available metal-air battery.
Advantages: Safety, Modularity, Low levelized costs.
Disadvantages: Not a high efficiency. Long life-cycle technologies not yet
commercially proven.
Ramping

Duration

Efficiency

Longevity

Cost/kWh

Immediate

4-6 hours.

75%

>10,000

160

Li-Ion Batteries
Li-ion batteries have a long history of use in consumer electronics where they are
valued for their high energy density and relatively low weight, with approximately 10-12
GWh installed globally (Rastler, 2010). This commercial maturity provides a market
advantage; this technology is positioned to be the primary battery system for electric
and plug-in hybrid vehicles, and could prove applicable for grid uses with duration
needs less than 4 hours.
Advantages: High Efficiency. High energy density.
Disadvantages: Limited lifespan. Safety Concerns (Fire). High levelized costs.
Ramping

Duration

Efficiency Longevity

Cost/MWh

20 milliseconds

15 min. – 4hrs.

90%

900 - 6200

Info not currently available
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Battery systems currently take a back seat to other energy storage applications, largely
due to safety and cost-effectiveness concerns, but rapid advances in battery
technology will make them formidable competitors in the energy storage field in coming
years.
In actually procuring and installing storage capability, utilities and commercial
investors alike will weigh the costs of each technology against the attainable value
streams for each application to determine whether or not they will be a cost-effective
deployment. These value streams are subject to and dependent upon both the
regulatory treatment of storage and market developments. Considerable uncertainty
exists in both of these areas, and could serve as a barrier to investment in storage
technologies.

3.4 Value Recovery/Means of Monetization
The main factor governing if and how storage becomes an independent and
transformative industry is an economic one; storage facilities will not be installed if
there are not sufficient prospects for owners and investors to recover the value that
they create. Though energy storage provides an array of benefits to the grid, much of
the value created by an ESS may be difficult for potential investors to monetize and
profit from. This could prove a substantial impediment to investment in energy storage
technologies. A medley of factors including but not limited to ownership, regulatory
developments and electricity prices will influence the potential for investors in storage
capacity to obtain the financial compensation needed to make the project cost-effective
(OEERE, 2011). Figure 8 on the following page illustrates the projected market size for
the key potential value streams of an energy storage industry. This graph clearly
illustrates that the potential for value creation exists for a prospective energy storage
sector. However, the means for recovery of that value may not yet exist under the
current electricity market structure in California.
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Figure 8: Projected Size of Market Potential for CA Energy Storage Industry, by $/kW.

There are two main obstacles to the realization of the value created by energy
storage; the first reason for this is the fact that many of the services provided by
storage – decreased likelihood of blackouts, generally lower electricity prices, etc. –
can be classified as public goods. If the electricity industry in CA remained a verticallyintegrated system owned and operated by utilities, this would not be an issue as these
overarching entities would be able to internalize most of the benefits provided by
storage to the system as a whole, by virtue of their position. In a deregulated, marketoperated electricity market, however, such goods are plagued by monetization issues
such as the free-rider problem, and often will not be produced at socially efficient
levels. The right amount of grid-connected energy storage can provide a plethora of
indirect benefits, but parties will not invest in this level of storage if they cannot realize
value from it. This is one argument for utility ownership of a certain amount of the
energy storage capacity on the grid; due to their relationship with the public sector,
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utilities are able to achieve cost recovery from such public goods through the Cost
Allocation Mechanism (CAM)1. While a private investor would look skeptically at the
cost-recovery prospects of installing storage for a generally more reliable grid, utility
companies are in fact guaranteed cost recovery as well as a reasonable level of profit
for investment in assets deemed beneficial to the grid by the public sector (Energy
Division, 2010). This problem is one fundamental to public goods and cannot
necessarily be fully addressed through changes to the market structure; this first issue
will be addressed in the Section 5, where policy recommendations are made.
The second main obstacle to monetization of storage’s benefits is a matter of
market design – storage does not fit neatly into the classification and valuation
mechanisms used by the market upon which grid assets are currently bid and sold.
The three main mechanisms for cost recovery of grid assets are the energy, capacity
and AS markets (Energy Division & Policy & Planning Division, 2013). While
alternatives to energy storage systems such as traditional generation, natural gas
peaking plants, and even energy efficiency resources can be broadly classified and
valued by these markets as either generation or load reduction, storage does not fit
into this paradigm. ESS are unique in their ability to switch temporally from acting as
either generation or load as well as in their ability to simultaneously provide multiple
benefits to the grid. Despite these attributes, under the current system storage must bid
into the same AS, energy and capacity markets as the other assets that these markets
have actually been constructed for; this means that the unique abilities of storage
systems such as extreme flexibility are not properly valued or compensated. While
storage can still be remunerated for certain value streams in this context, studies have
found that ESS are not usually cost-effective in scenarios where compensation is
provided for only one or several of its value streams. For storage systems to become
economic, allowing society to obtain all of the real but currently intangible benefits it
provides, more comprehensive mechanisms must be constructed for the full cost
recovery of storage projects by all parties.

1

The CAM is a means by which utilities can “socialize” the cost of new, CEC-approved grid
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3.4.1 CA Energy Markets
A good deal of ESS value lies in their ability to make the grid operate more efficiently
and reliably as a whole, but some of their services do fit into the traditional markets for
electricity grid assets in California. Here the CA markets for three fundamental energy
services – capacity, ancillary services, and energy – are analyzed by virtue of their
current and future prospects as cost recovery mechanisms for ESS.

Capacity
In contrast to other load-balancing entities such as the NYISO and PJM, the CAISO
does not have an explicit market for capacity procurement. Rather, the CAISO
mandates the adequate level of procurement for each LSE (currently defined as 1517% above the forecast system need at any time) and then leaves it to LSE’s to
procure adequate capacity through bilateral contracts (Energy Division & Policy &
Planning Division, 2013). Although determining the capacity value of an ESS is a
difficult task due to the need for detailed modeling of system operations, this is a
promising value proposition for utilities investing in ESS as capacity prices may
increase as dispatchable generation is replaced with variable resources (OEERE,
2011). Though ESS are not currently eligible to provide capacity to utilities through the
RA program, the CPUC is in the process of considering a rulemaking to allow
compensation of ESS services in this way. There is a target date of 2014 for the CPUC
ruling, meaning that if ESS qualify, utilities will soon be able to fulfill resource adequacy
requirements through bilateral contracts with ESS merchant owners and developers
(Cho, 2013). There has been a discussion of implementing a formal market for capacity
like the ones that exist for other systems (Energy and Planning Division, 2013), in
hopes that this would address the issue that “backup capacity is needed but not
adequately remunerated” (Beckman, 2013).

Ancillary Services
Ancillary Services markets exist to ensure that enough flexible resources are made
available for the CAISO to bring online as is necessary to balance supply and load. In
California, AS markets exist for Frequency Regulation, Spinning Reserve, Nonspinning Reserve, Voltage Support and Black Start (definitions from Lin et al., 2011).
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Frequency Regulation: A resource that can rapidly alter electricity output in response
to direct digital control (Automatic Generation Control, or AGC) signals in order to
maintain the target system frequency. AGC is used to maintain the Area Control Error
(ACE) in the face of rapid load fluctuations, which can cause deviation from the ideal
frequency and output. Can be further divided into Regulation Up (increase in output)
and Regulation Down (decrease in output).
Spinning Reserve: The portion of unloaded synchronized generating capacity that is
immediately responsive to system frequency and that is capable of being loaded in ten
minutes, and that is capable of running for at least two hours
Non-Spinning Reserve: The portion of generating capacity that is capable of being
synchronized and ramping to a specified load in ten minutes (or load that is capable of
being interrupted in ten minutes) and that is capable of running (or being interrupted)
Voltage Support: Services provided by generating units or other equipment such as
shunt capacitors, static VAR compensators, or synchronous condensers that are
required to maintain established grid voltage criteria. This service is required under
normal or system emergency conditions
Black Start: The procedure by which a generating unit self - starts without an external
source of electricity thereby restoring a source of power to the CAISO balancing
authority area following system or local area blackouts.
In particular, the Frequency Regulation market provides a compelling opportunity for
energy storage technologies, which can provide both Regulation Up and Regulation
Down services, unlike traditional regulation resources. Frequency regulation is a
particularly viable use case for LESRs, for whom “the economic opportunity….is not in
shifting power from off-peak to on-peak, but from their rapid response rate” (NY ISO,
March 2010). Black start also provides a promising value proposition for storage
facilities, in particular battery systems, which need no external electricity to be brought
online.
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While the CAISO required only 419MW of regulation capacity in 2009 (PG&E,
2010) it is predicted that when the state reaches its goal of 33% RPS, 1,114 MW of
regulation capacity will be needed (CAISO, 2010). Quick ramping, flexible resources
like most ESS can prove to be 3 to 3 times as efficient per MW rated power capacity
than traditional regulation resources for two reasons (Lin et al., 2011). Firstly, FR can
achieve their target level of dispatch much more quickly meaning that they can then be
ordered to increase or reduce dispatch more often. Second, traditional resources have
longer ramping periods and cannot shift their dispatch from positive to neutral or
negative quickly and thus sometimes in fact dispatch in the wrong direction to meet
system needs. For these reasons, investment in flexible regulation resources, as
opposed to traditional slow-ramping ones, could decrease regulation procurement
needs by up to 40% for CAISO – an enormous cost savings (Makarov et al, 2008). A
CPUC analysis of different ESS use cases found that Frequency Regulation revenue
was one of the most important value streams for ESS, and that the implementation of a
rule that explicitly values “flexibility” of a resource would improve the cost-effectiveness
of many ESS (EPRI, 2013). The CAISO has taken steps towards compensating FR for
this valuable efficiency improvement (see Table 3), and CESA continues to lobby for
AS markets more receptive to ESS characteristics and that more properly value ESS
capabilities.

Energy
In order to acquire the electricity used in AS markets, arbitrage or for end use, ESS
that is not paired with generation will purchase electricity either from local LSEs or by
bidding directly onto the CAISO energy market as traditional generation or load,
depending upon their size. There currently exists a 500kW minimum for resources to
bid onto the CAISO wholesale market (FERC, 2010), which is an improvement from
the previous 1MW requirement, but still places an inefficient restriction on smaller
resources. Those smaller, distributed storage resources purchasing retail energy on
the LSE tariffs will not be participating in energy arbitrage per se as they will not resell
the energy, but rather will purchase electricity when it is inexpensive for later use when
prices are higher at times of peak demand. Larger resources may attempt to take
advantage of electricity price disparities between on- and off-peak pricing periods, or
even between different electricity markets, by purchasing large blocks of cheap energy
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and selling it later at a higher price. There does not currently exist a very strong
economic case for ESS as residential energy management or for large scale energy
arbitrage in CA, but this could and likely will change as the structure of electricity prices
and LSE tariffs in CA come to more appropriately reflect the true social costs of
generation.
There have been efforts, both at the federal and the state level, to improve these
three markets in such a way that they will be able to more properly value and
incentivize the unique capabilities of ESS and other FR. Table 3 on the following page
highlights several of the most important recent pieces of legislation that have been
passed with this goal in mind. These pieces of legislation mark progress towards the
creation of a market structure that more appropriately values ESS and FR for their
system benefits. In particular, the changes propelled by FERC 890 include
amendments to the CAISO tariff that make the AS markets much more accessible to
non-generator resources by 1) reducing the minimum power rating for eligibility to
500kW from 1MW 2) specifying that resources will only be counted as providing energy
under the continuous energy requirement once they have reached their target level of
dispatch (not while ramping) 3) reducing the continuous energy requirement for AS to
30 minutes for spinning and non-spinning reserves, 60 minutes for day-ahead
regulation, and 30 minutes for real-time regulation (from the current unilateral two hour
requirement) (FERC, 2010).
At the moment the CA electricity markets present several disjointed but usable
avenues for the realization of some of storages’ value streams. Of the ESS value
streams not applicable to these markets, some are inherently restricted to certain
ownership categories – for example the deferral of new transmission and distribution
lines by utilities. Four general ownership categories can be identified as utilities,
merchants, generators and end users. Each of these parties will have different
incentives for how to use their storage capacity and indeed different prospects for
value recovery due to some market limitations.
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Table 3: Legislative Market Reform for ESS in CA.
Legislation

Effect

Status

AB 2514

Mandates 1.325 GW of procurement goals for IOUs in

Active in CA.

California by 2020.
SB 412

Self Generation Incentive Program provides $2.00/W rated

Active in CA.

capacity to storage systems capable of discharging at
capacity for at least 2 hours a day. Maximum size of 3 MW.
Federal

Allows for a federal tax rebate of 30% of ESS project value,

Investment

if paired with photovoltaics.

Active in CA.

Tax Credit
FERC 890

Requires ISO to “"account for the special circumstances

Tariff Amendments

presented by intermittent generators” by developing

implemented by

appropriate market rules, tariffs, and control algorithms for

CAISO.

new technologies such as ESS.
FERC 755

FERC 764

Establishes two-tier compensation method for ancillary

Implemented by

service markets. Adds pay-for-performance standard,

CAISO (with

increasing the value of flexible assets like energy storage.

mileage product).

Transmission providers to offer an option to schedule

Implementation

energy in 15 - minute increments, creates an opportunity to

planned (Spring

improve CAISO real - time market design (proposed full

2014)

three settlement market: day ahead, 15 minute real time, 5
minute real time markets) (Casey, 2013).
FERC 784

Permits third parties to sell AS to transmission providers at

Not yet

market-based rates. Requires transmission providers to

implemented by

consider speed and accuracy of resources in determining

CAISO.

reserve requirements for self-supply of AS. Creates
reporting mechanisms to track and record ESS costs for
increased transparency.
FERC 792

Expands Small Generation Interconnection Agreements

Not yet

and Procedures to include energy storage devices.

implemented by

Clarifies capacity stating LSE’s should “generally assume

CAISO.

the maximum capacity that the storage device is capable of
injecting when deciding whether a device may be
interconnected” (Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, 2013)
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3.4.2 Ownership Category
Utilities
Utilities are perhaps the best positioned entities to simultaneously capture multiple
value streams from energy storage projects, and as such the most likely to find costeffective applications for storage technology. ESS have greater value if deployed as a
system level asset (OEERE, 2011), and utilities are the best positioned to employ them
in such a way due to their control of T&D lines and their relationships with parties at all
points on the grid. Utilities have been left to bear many of the costs of renewable
integration in California. Energy storage projects will allow the deferral of expensive
T&D system upgrades that would otherwise be necessitated by increasing levels of
renewable energy penetration, as well as helping utilities avoid imbalance charges that
are increasing annually with RES market penetration – total CAISO charges increased
from around $165 million in 2011 to nearly $235 million in 2012 (Kurlinski, 2013.). At
the same time, utility-owned ESS will be able to provide services to the CAISO’s
energy and ancillary services markets including the newly-adjusted, pay-forperformance Frequency Regulation market that explicitly values the quick response
times of many ESS (See Table 3). Some regulatory uncertainty does come in to play
here – if the storage resource is owned by a publicly regulated utility or other LSE, then
presumably the project should be financed via the CAM – it is unclear whether ESS
owned by such an entity should be able to access AS market revenues (DNV KEMA,
n.d.).
Capacity
Utilities and other Load Serving Entities (LSE) in CA are required to procure and
demonstrate Resource Adequacy (RA) on an annual basis. Utilities are generally
expected to own little capacity themselves but rather to purchase their RA
requirements through contracts with third parties, and then to distribute the costs of this
among energy users through the CAM. There is no centralized market for capacity in
CA at the moment, although there is discussion of introducing one in the face of
increasing future capacity needs (Energy Division and Policy & Planning Division,
2013).
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Merchant
It is unlikely that utilities will be allowed ownership over most of the ESS installed on
the CA grid. The mandate allows for 50% ownership, but this will likely decrease as
ESS become less of a novelty and come to be viewed as more of a standard grid
asset, which utilities have been discouraged from owning in California since the
deregulation of the electricity market at the turn of the century. Under the mandate 50%
of the ESS must be procured from third parties, and if an independent industry for
storage develops in CA it will likely take the form of merchant-owned storage facilities.
These facilities will (dependent on the aforementioned CPUC ruling) be able to sell
capacity to LSE’s as well as to bid into the ancillary services and energy markets.
Specifically in the energy markets, merchant owners could look to profit from energy
arbitrage.
Energy Arbitrage
Energy arbitrage is perhaps the most intuitive and straightforward potential use for
energy storage, and is hypothetically possible for any entity that submits energy bids
into the CAISO energy markets. Most studies have found that investments in energy
storage technologies for energy arbitrage purposes alone would not provide ample
revenue to achieve what is normally considered an acceptable return on investment
(Kintner-Meyer, 2010). This could certainly change within the California framework if
legislation is introduced to address the increasing disparity between generation peak
hours and peak load through a more responsive, real-time pricing mechanism that
would help create more extractable value in this area; AB 327 suggests this may
happen before the end of this decade. Dependent on location, enterprising merchant
storage owners could also leverage differences between energy markets; a proposed
CAES plant in Texas is looking to do just that by purchasing and providing energy on
both the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and the Southwest Power Pool
(SPP) markets (Giberson, 2011). Although arbitrage is at its core a profit-maximizing
behavior, it can produce some welfare effects by leveraging lower electricity prices in
one area and selling them at competitive prices in another, presumably utilizing
available energy more efficiently and cost-effectively; indeed, a study found that of all
third-party owners, merchant-owned ESS would provide the most welfare benefits
(Sioshansi, 2010).
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Renewable Energy Generators
Although it is not the most valuable use of ESS to the system as a whole to have
facilities co-located on-site with generation due to incentive issues that lead to the
production of an inefficiently high amount of producer surplus (Sioshansi, 2010; EPRI,
2013), renewable energy suppliers could benefit in several ways from on-site storage.
Higher Value for Power Purchase Agreements
Storage capabilities would allow intermittent renewables to “smooth” their energy
output and make their energy more predictable, and thus more attractive and valuable
to utilities and other potential contract customers who wish to form Power Purchase
Agreements (PPAs). With sufficient storage, certain types of intermittent renewables
could become dispatchable, thus increasing their capacity value. As an expert contact
in the Regulatory and Market Affairs Division at Brightsource Energy expressed to me
during a conversation about storage, the storage capability that is inherently present in
their concentrated solar power (CSP) technology is their main competitive advantage
over other renewable energy generators, fetching their energy a higher price in Power
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) made with utilities. Although the several PPA’s
Brightsource held that explicitly valued their energy storage capabilities were either
rejected by the CPUC or have been terminated, the ability to internally control their own
energy output is of great value to them as a generation facility (David Schlosberg,
Personal Communication, November 2013).
Sales on CALPX
Generation facilities not under contract, on the other hand, could hypothetically hold
their energy from the market until peak hours when it fetched a higher price on the
CALPX market, a form of arbitrage of sorts. As levels of intermittent generation
increase, however, storage will most importantly allow generators to dramatically
decrease losses from curtailment orders, simply storing the energy until it was
permissible to release it to the market, rather than letting their facilities sit idle.
Curtailment comes at a high cost to renewable energy providers – they would lose both
the 12 cent/kWh production incentive that they currently earn in CA, as well as
effectively increasing the levelized cost of their energy because they would be
producing less energy while capital costs remained the same.
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Customer/End User
Electricity consumers – residential or C&I customers - who wish for more control over
when and at what price they purchase electricity from the grid may invest in an ESS.
Much of the value of an ESS to an end user will be related to their own personal
electricity bill –note that time-of-use (TOU) energy management is by far the most
valuable potential market value in Figure 8 - by investing in an ESS, they will be able to
avoid peak rates and reduce potentially expensive peak demand surcharges.
Empowering consumers to take greater control of their energy use patterns is of no
small value – this use has in fact been estimated to be the largest source of market
potential for a national energy storage industry (see Figure 8), if the correct incentives
are provided. For residential customers in CA, the recently passed AB 327 prohibits the
implementation of mandatory time-of-use (TOU) pricing until 2018, at which point the
CPUC is authorized to mandate TOU (CALSEIA, 2013). This should open up a large
market for residential scale, distributed energy storage that can be aggregated and
used as grid scale-assets – a similar trend is already happening with C&I customers
who currently face TOU pricing in CA.
Since the passage of the California mandate, a company named Stem has
targeted hotels, chain stores and restaurants as potential customers for its load shifting
technologies, which they say could decrease a customers’ energy bill by 10-40%
(Wang, 2013). In addition to saving their customers a substantial amount of money,
companies such as Stem may be able to sell the capacity provided by their units to
utilities; Stem is currently in talks with some CA utilities about such an arrangement.
The use of such technology also provides a valuable public good in generally cheaper
and cleaner electricity, as a reduction of only 5-10% in peak demand has been shown
to dramatically decrease electricity prices across a given area (Fox-Penner, 2010).
Although incentives for such behavior exist for the commercial and industrial sectors
since the implementation of time-of-use charges, until 2018 the majority of retail
customers will receive only tiered rates that do not reflect the true production costs of
the energy they use, and that therefore provide little incentive to manage energy use
temporally.
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Efforts are being made to create a more competitive marketplace for energy
services in California, in which all parties can more easily realize the value provided by
ESS. Indeed, bulk energy time management and ancillary service markets will provide
the majority of the cost-effective value propositions for energy storage systems in the
near term (EPRI, 2013). The problem with all of these niche value propositions,
however, is that they only exist because of the fact that the grid is operating on the 20th
century, load balancing paradigm due to the fundamental inability to store energy.
Energy market products such as Frequency Regulation have value precisely because
of the need to instantaneously match supply with demand, which would not be as much
of an issue on a grid with significant storage capacity. This means that some of the
benefits accrued to society from the installation of storage, including progress towards
such a future grid, may be true public goods and as such must be addressed through
policy and larger economic incentives rather than by simple restructuring of the market.
The following section identifies some of the public goods provided by energy storage.

3.5 Systemic Effects of Storage on Grid
The role to be played on the electricity grid by ESS and its substitute load-balancing
services will only increase as California moves closer to its 2050 emissions reduction
goal. The recently legislated AB 327 has established California’s 2020 goal of 33%
renewables as a floor, and authorized the CPUC to further increase RPS procurement
goals. Between this and the recent success of the state’s carbon cap and trade
program, which has completely sold out of permits during its first two years of operation
(Spross, 2013), it can be stated with a fair amount of certainty that the state is headed
in the direction of continually expanding levels of RES as well as towards the
internalization of the costs of carbon emissions. These trends will combine to create
more viable cost-effective applications for energy storage, as a complement to a
growing RES sector. At the same time, the ability of the grid to store electricity from
these resources through ESS will become a much more important public good as well.
Section 2.3 discussed the increasing probability of curtailment of RES as market
penetration levels increase, if storage is not installed or other measures taken to
prevent this. The alternative is a huge public investment in transmission lines at an
equally huge cost to taxpayers, but this will not be necessary if storage is installed in
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strategic locations, allowing loads to be shifted by a couple of hours or more. Both
California’s RPS and its cap and trade program will function to bolster the case for ESS
as a means of reducing curtailments and avoiding overinvestment in transmission.
ESS technologies are valuable to the grid as a whole because they give grid
operators the ability to maximize energy production from the lowest marginal cost (and
cleanest, if pollution costs are internalized) generation resources on the grid, given the
generation assets that exist. At the moment, when RES facilities are told to curtail
production they reduce their output of zero marginal cost, zero emissions energy,
which is later compensated for by ramping up production of peaking plants, usually in
the form of Flexible Thermal Generation (FTG). RES producers operating under a PPA
are fairly indifferent when it comes to curtailment because their contracts with IOUs
include a provision that they will be compensated at a specified price for curtailed
generation (Mulooly et al., 2011). This system is fundamentally inefficient from an
economic, a GHG emissions, and a purely energetic point of view.

Economic
When the grid turns down a unit of renewable energy, it means two things. First, that
unit of curtailed energy will need to be compensated for by the production of an equal
unit of fossil-fuel derived energy at a later time, which in addition to costing more under
the GHG cap and trade framework also creates the need for more FTG capacity.
Second, due to the fact that the RPS mandates that a certain amount of energy
delivered for retail use be derived from renewable sources, the decision not to produce
this unit of renewable energy also means that another unit of renewable energy must
be produced elsewhere as well, to fulfill RPS obligations. If all RES are not producing
energy at 100% of their capability, it will require the construction of more RES plants on
the grid than is truly necessary to reach this goal. It will also require overinvestment in
the expensive FTG facilities that compensate for these RES during on-peak hours.
Even though electricity prices do not represent with complete accuracy the
actual marginal system costs of producing a unit of energy, they can be a good proxy
for the overall efficiency with which grid assets are being employed because they do
reflect a general socialization of the costs of electricity production by the utility or other
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load serving entity. A 2004 study modeling the effects of CAES, battery and PHS on
electricity prices found that in a scenario involving 20 percent wind energy supply by
2030, storage could function to significantly decrease electricity prices (Sullivan et al.,
2008). It is important to consider that many ESS value propositions are highly
dependent on high energy prices (EPRI, 2013). If enough storage is deployed to
drastically reduce energy prices it is possible that some value propositions of these
storage devices could be threatened by their own effects on the system. Clearly,
however, if energy prices drop further with the addition of more storage then value is
still created with the addition of ESS. This is simply not value that can be easily
monetized by any single party, and thus can be considered a public good that should
be incentivized.

Carbon Dioxide Emissions
The major externality that is often not included in the prices seen by today’s energy
users is the social costs of the Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emitted during its production. In
the energy sector, there is already an implicit cost in fossil fuel use due to the RPS. As
explained in the previous section, there is a very expensive opportunity cost involved in
the substitution of carbon intensive energy production for carbon neutral sources.
California has taken further steps towards internalizing the costs of these emissions
through the establishment of a cap and trade (C&T) system for CO2. In theory, this
C&T system should lower the “cost-effectiveness bar” for ESS and other clean
technologies by making it more expensive to use 20th century, heavily polluting ones to
create electricity, thus incentivizing the CA electricity sector to institute a larger number
of technologies with CO2 mitigation potential. It is not so clear, however, that ESS will
help reduce the energy sector’s CO2 emissions as a whole if storage facilities are
dispatched in the most cost-effective manner. The earliest applications of ESS will be
employed towards the most profitable opportunities, and potentially towards
applications which may not be in line with using ESS to reduce CO2 emissions as is
laid out below.
If employed properly, ESS has the potential to reduce an electricity sector’s CO2
emissions by storing renewable, zero marginal cost and zero emissions electricity and
using it to replace the energy that would otherwise be created by fossil-fuel powered
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plants at peak hours. The clearest case of this would be with a storage facility owned
and located with a renewable energy producer. This RES might be told to curtail their
energy production at off-peak hours in order to avoid the curtailment of other resources
with a higher cost to shut down, or to reduce the strain on transmission lines.
Traditionally, this energy would be replaced with electricity created from fossil-fuel
powered peaking plants, but if the RES had storage on-site they would be able to hold
this energy until it was needed and release it at peak hours, mitigating the need for
operation of the peaking plant.
This is the most basic example, however, and the carbon mitigation potential of
ESS becomes much less clear when storage is installed elsewhere in the grid. For one,
an ESS that operated in the same way as the RES-owned and operated one discussed
above, but that drew electricity from the grid, would in fact be drawing indiscriminately
from the aggregate production of all resources on-line at that time. If fossil-fuel plants
are running at this time, as they are in fact running 24 hours a day in CA, storage
facilities will in fact be storing and dispatching dirty energy as well as clean. The
inability of grid-connected storage to discriminate between clean and dirty energy
makes the CO2 mitigation potential of ESS technologies, and thus the potential for
CO2 reduction policies to financially propel an energy storage industry, much more
ambiguous. An ESS integration study of the Dutch electricity system in fact found that
the implementation of ESS increased the total amount of CO2 emissions by employing
cheap, off-peak coal-generated electricity to offset the lower-carbon, but more
expensive to run, natural gas plants that are used at peak hours (Ummels et al., 2008).
The relationship between off-peak wind and coal may not be such a large issue
in CA due to the relatively low amount of coal-powered baseload plants in operation in
the state (Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc., 2010), but the lesson remains
the same. Under real market conditions, the system with the least dispatch cost (shortrun marginal cost) is dispatched first (Greenblatt, 2013), and even though RES have a
marginal cost of dispatch near zero, some baseload coal plants will in fact pay to avoid
curtailing output due to potentially expensive cycling costs that could reach as high as
$0.47–1.14/MWh of curtailed energy, under a high RES market penetration scenario
(Lew, 2012). When cycling costs are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that
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ESS could potentially mitigate some of the carbon cost implicit in the RPS. If an ESS
absorbed off peak coal energy from a generator willing to pay them to do so and
provided it to the grid later, the storage would in fact serve to substitute coal generation
for what would normally be on-peak generation from natural gas, which is a cleaner, if
more expensive, alternative. Until there is a carbon price high enough to offset cycling
costs, this will be an issue. Only a price on carbon that would push baseload coal
plants’ marginal costs of operation during off peak hours higher than the cost of halting
operations and suffering the costs of restarting the plant will address this issue. Until
then, coal generators would rather sell this energy at a cost to ESS facilities and ESS
that is employed from a lowest system-cost standpoint will in fact enable coal, the
cheapest dirty generation.
While ESS, in particular ESS with long storage capacities, have the potential to
mitigate some level of CO2 emissions, the direct emissions effects of storage
implementation in all but the most basic applications is far from clear. Regulatory
uncertainty abounds – for example, if an ESS provides sufficient load to allow a RES to
continue providing energy to the grid, but the ESS draws this energy from the grid as a
whole, should that energy be credited as free of emissions? Due to such uncertainties,
ESS probably should not and will not be significantly affected by CO2 pricing schemes
until a better means of establishing its system-wide CO2 effects is developed.

Energetic
Though boundary lines do need to be drawn at some point in the analysis of a system,
it is important to at least consider the energetic effects of constructing and using
energy storage devices themselves. Indeed, a recent study found that from a net
energetic perspective, it would be inefficient to store the energy from a wind facility
using any extant battery technology, largely because some of these technologies could
only store over their lifetime the equivalent of four or five times the amount of energy
that was expended in producing them (Barnhart et al., 2013). They further asserted
that “electricity generated using solar PV technologies can be stored eﬃciently using
all plotted technologies, while wind power should be stored with more energetically
favorable storage options such as PHS and CAES” (Barnhart et al., 2013). These net
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energy implications are important from an environmental standpoint, but likely will not
be considered in the actual deployment of storage technologies.
Significant curtailment of renewable resources in California is still a future issue,
but a not too distant one. Figure 5 demonstrated that significant curtailment can begin
as early as 40% market penetration of intermittent RES. At this point the decision will
have to be made whether it would be wiser for the state to invest in energy storage to
ensure that all of these clean energy facilities are optimized, or to construct additional
FTG as well as more renewable energy generation facilities than is truly necessary to
meet the RPS. This would be an incredibly expensive social investment in unnecessary
grid infrastructure, and at this point the use case for long-duration storage should
become much more attractive. Even before this point, however, energy storage can
provide a valuable public good in reduced electricity prices for the system as a whole.
Chapter 4 constructs some scenarios to see how these systemic effects of energy
storage might play out at various levels of storage deployment on the California
electricity grid.
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Chapter 4: Scenarios
Energy storage as a grid asset is only in the early stages of commercialization, and as
such no “standard model” has been established for how it should be deployed. It is
unclear at the moment whether the 1.325 GW of mandated storage, or the storage
installed after that, will take the form of large, centralized bulk storage units or a larger
number of smaller, distributed energy storage (DES) units. Further, it is not evident that
Energy Storage Systems (ESS) will become an established, cost-effective grid asset
independent of the CPUC procurement mandate, which equates to a significant but
certainly not a transformative presence of storage on the grid. As I was told by the
former Chairman of the California Energy Commission (CEC), the true metric used by
utilities when it comes to installation of grid assets is “what does it cost to keep the
lights on” (Joe Desmond, personal communication, November 2013). If load serving
entities (LSE) can “keep the lights on” more cost-effectively in the face of a changing
grid through the use of alternative schemes and technologies, storage will not find
many cost-effective implementations.
In this chapter, we construct several possible scenarios based on
plausible projections of the current regulatory and economic state of the energy market
in California. The potentially transformative nature of distributed energy storage to the
current, environmentally damaging energy use paradigm makes it tempting to
speculate as to what effects large scale deployment of such technology might have,
but the difficulties involved in quantitative modeling of such systemic effects remind us
that it is important to remember that these are only possibilities and not forecasts. The
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy has estimated that it would take
approximately 10,000 person-hours to develop a tool capable of measuring and
contrasting the respective values of distributed and bulk energy storage systems over
the next ten years (OEERE, 2011). Though that was not an endeavor that fell within
the scope of this thesis, what this paper truly aims to assess is not the normative
question of how the grid should develop its storage capacity but rather the positivistic
one of how grid scale storage likely will develop in the state of California. For this
purpose it is important to first assess the primary “competition” for grid-scale ESS.

53

4. 1 Substitute Goods
Energy storage is not the only answer to the issues faced by California’s evolving
electricity grid in coming decades. Energy storage techniques are only one way to
address the difficulties associated with renewables integration, and are unique from
competitors only in their ability to address many of these issues simultaneously. This
capability comes with a price tag, however, and if alternatives exist that will allow the
grid to deal with these problems more cheaply, these will be implemented first. The
three main grid assets that can provide some of the same services as an ESS, or
“substitute goods”, are Flexible Thermal Generation (FTG), demand response (DR),
and the sharing of supplies and reserves over large areas through increased
connectivity.

Long Distance Electricity Trading
One option for integrating renewable resources is the establishment of larger
“balancing areas” (BA) – interconnected grids that can trade energy services in order to
establish economies of scale and more competitive ancillary services markets. The
main value of larger BAs to renewables integration can be found in the concept of
“statistical independence” (EERE, 2011). This term refers to the idea that while the real
time variability in output of any given RES may be high, a larger BA can aggregate the
outputs of a much larger amount of RES, spread across a larger geographic area, thus
lowering the statistical probability that aggregate output will vary significantly in real
time. There has in fact been a trend towards larger balancing areas in the US over the
past few decades, with the CAISO recently approving the market design for a Western
Interconnection Imbalance Market that will allow CAISO to trade energy and energyrelated services with the Oregon-based PacifiCorp, expected to go online in October
2014 (Renew Grid, 2013).
There are limits to the ability of this option to serve as a useful RES integration
resource. First, the CAISO already constitutes a large balancing area in and of itself,
responsible for managing 80% of California’s electricity flow and roughly 35% of the
electricity used in the entire Western Interconnection (CAISO, 2013). While enlarging a
BA would certainly prove beneficial to small, isolated grids, the CAISO already has
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access to a large variety of technologically and geographically diverse resources; it is
not clear that further expansion would provide substantial benefits to such a large BA,
especially when the substantial transmission and congestion costs of long distance
transmission are accounted for. Second, while increased cooperation between or even
consolidation of BAs is desirable from the standpoint of statistical independence and
competitive energy markets, the ability of ISOs to do so is limited by the physical reality
of existing transmission lines. Growth in peak demand from AC units, computers and
other modern necessities has exceeded transmission capacity annually by 25% (Brown
& Koomey, 2003). California already faces a shortage of transmission lines which has
caused the appearance of “transmission-constrained” areas that suffer from a lack of
“local capacity” even while “system capacity” is in oversupply (Energy Division & Policy
& Planning Division, 2013). Even within the context of CAISO, the CPUC has identified
this issue as a reason to pursue investment in flexible resources (FR) like ESS, which
can address local capacity needs without the construction of transmission lines, rather
than to build new T&D lines, which can take five to ten years to install and carry very
high fixed costs. All of this means that while contracts between the CAISO and other
BAs could yield some desirable results, they would likely come with very high
transaction costs in the form of new transmission lines.

Flexible Thermal Generation
Another potential substitute for ESS is the installation of more Flexible Thermal
Generation (FTG) capacity, primarily in the form of natural gas peaking plants.
Compared to other forms of conventional generation, these plants have the lowest
upfront investment costs and comparatively high fuel costs (Eurelectric, 2011), making
them an attractive option for LSEs looking to add capacity that will be operational only
during times of peak load. ESS employed for the purpose of meeting peak load have
nearly the opposite investment profile – extremely high upfront costs and negligible
operational and maintenance costs once installed. In procuring either resource,
potential investors will ultimately choose one based on the levelized cost of energy
(LCOE) of each resource. LCOE computation can be a highly detailed procedure when
discounting and other necessary subtleties come into play, but in concept is fairly
simple: divide the lifetime costs of procuring, running and maintaining an energy
resource by the amount of electricity it can provide over its lifetime. While this metric is
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very complicated to compute for an ESS due to the multiplicity of potential operational
strategies for such a system, the lifetime costs to the system, once procured, would be
very certain as fixed, upfront costs account for a much greater portion of ESS costs
than variable ones (Rastler et al., 2012). For FTG, on the other hand, LCOE is
extremely dependent upon fuel prices - installing FTG is making a bet on low natural
gas prices for ten or fifteen years, a risky move for the CA electricity grid.
Traditionally FTG been used to provide peaking power as well as ancillary
services (AS) to the electricity grid due to their relative operational flexibility as
compared to other traditional generation plants, which often incur high costs when
cycling – changing output to produce significantly more or less power than their rated
capacity (Lefton & Besuner, 2006). An “average” FTG could be considered one with
the ability to ramp at 5.1% per minute, reaching full power output in about 20 minutes,
although newer, state-of-the-art plants will have superior operational features (Lin et al,
2011). Though this flexibility is competitive with that of bulk storage techniques such as
compressed air energy storage (CAES), it is significantly slower than that of most
LESRs. This has implications for the AS applications and effectiveness of each
technology; one study found that the CA electricity grid would require 2.5 times the
amount of rated power capacity in FTG to provide the regulation services that could be
provided by flywheel technology (Makarov et al., 2008). Lin et al., 2008, provides an
illustrative example of how a LESR might help avoid excess capacity on the grid:
“Imagine that a system operator experiences a sudden generation loss. To meet NERC
requirements2, the operator must bring on 25 MW in additional generation within the next ten
minutes. In other words, over the next ten minutes, the system operator needs a 2.5 MW per
minute ramp rate total from all generators providing regulation. If the only regulation generators
are gas turbines with a 5.1% ramp rate, there needs to be 49.1 MW of these gas turbines
online to meet the operator’s ramp requirement. In contrast, 25 MW of energy storage could
provide the full 25 MW of additional power within 20 milliseconds.”

Despite the superiority of certain ESS technologies in terms of flexibility, FTG also
holds one very important advantage: unlimited generation capacity. While an ESS can
2

NERC CPS2 requirements
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deploy electricity to the grid at is rated power capacity only until the energy it is capable
of storing runs out, once a FTG has ramped fully it can provide its rated power to the
grid for an indefinite amount of time, using the energy stored in a virtually unlimited
supply of fossil fuels. LESRs such as the flywheels modeled in Makarov et al., 2008,
can dispatch their power instantaneously, they can do so for only a limited amount of
time, making them more suitable for addressing unpredictable net load swings caused
by contingencies such as weather patterns or generation loss, as in the example cited
above. It is for this reason that although ESS and FTG will compete for some value
streams on the future grid, at the moment the two are better viewed as complementary
goods (Casten, 2013).
The types of bulk storage ESS that could compete with FTG for applications
with longer energy needs, such as CAES and pumped hydroelectric storage (PHS),
faced higher upfront costs as well as the same transmission constraints as FTG, while
LESRs are not truly viable replacements for FTG in terms of provision of peak power.
Until a commercially viable ESS with high power and energy capacity comes to the
market, both flexible thermal generation and energy storage resources will be
necessary on the CA electricity grid. A study conducted by Eurelectric concluded that
in Europe “gas-fired power stations will be one of the most important contributors to the
integration of RES” (Eurelectric, 2011), the same will likely be true for California in the
absence of disruptive technological change in the ESS sector.

Demand Response
Demand response (DR) can be defined basically as programs that influence the
behavior of end-use electricity consumers through incentives or other pricing schemes
in order to reduce their demand at peak hours. Although DR requires the use of
financial incentives to influence behavior, it can often be one of the cheapest options
available in addressing load balancing issues due to the capital-intensive nature of
electricity grid infrastructure. Indeed, pilot programs in the US have reported a benefit:
cost ratio of 7:1 for certain programs (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008). DR resources are
already in use by investor-owned utilities (IOU) statewide that currently use them to
meet Resource Adequacy requirements (Perlstein et al., 2012); one of the most widely
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used DR techniques is time-of-use (TOU) pricing, which has been found to be
especially effective when combined with critical peak pricing.
DR has the potential to provide cost-effective mitigation of grid reliability
concerns at low RES penetration levels, but it has limitations. First, DR depends on
shifting consumer behavior and studies have shown the when it comes to electricity
use, consumers have a very low elasticity in the short run (Borenstein et al, 2009).
Elasticity of demand for electricity increases in the long run and in response to very
aggressive pricing policies, which have achieved in reducing peak demand by up to
42% (Charles River Associates, 2005). The fact remains, however, that while some
consumer electricity use can be shifted from peak periods with appropriate price
signals, the electricity usage of most consumers is determined more by their daily
schedule than by their electricity bill. While some electricity end-uses, i.e. agricultural
pumping, can occur at any time of the day, there are some uses of electricity that are
time dependent and simply cannot be shifted (for example, lighting or use of
appliances) without the use of technologies with temporal load shifting capabilities.
Second, while DR can cost-effectively shift general usage patterns, it lacks in the areas
of response time and precision, characteristics that are essential to the proper function
of AS markets. A recent report found that although DR could be a good candidate for
the new flexible resources AS markets in CA, nearly all DR programs would require at
least some modifications in order to become eligible for the AS market (Perlstein et al.,
2012). Lastly, while DR can effectively provide regulation up services to the grid, they
are limited in their ability to provide regulation down services, which would consist of
programs to increase consumer demand, a goal seemingly perverse to the conceptual
motivations of DR in the first place.
Demand response measures can achieve some of the same goals as energy
storage by taking advantage of elasticity of electricity demand, where it exists, and
promoting load-shifting behavior through the use of incentives. In this sense DR and
ESS can be considered competitive, substitute goods for some applications. At the
same time, however, the very changes in consumer behavior that DR aims to induce –
reduction of electricity usage during peak load, shifting of load and investment in onsite generation capacity – further necessitate technologies with load-shifting capability
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such as ESS for situations where electricity demand is truly inelastic, and energy must
be used during certain time of day. One notable example of this is can be seen in Ice
Energy’s thermal energy storage systems, which are used to shift customers’ electricity
consumption for daytime air-conditioning uses to the nighttime. Through the aptly
named “Project Cool Move”, Ice Energy aggregates a network of distributed storage
units to provide clean, cheap capacity for purchase by utilities (Ice Energy website)
while simultaneously allowing customers to take advantage of the incentives provided
by TOU pricing. Thus while DR may at first disadvantage ESS by providing a lowercost option for shifting energy use in some situations, in the long run the incentive
structures created by DR measures will create more value propositions for certain ESS
technologies, especially those with long duration load-shifting capabilities.
As the CA electricity grid currently exists, there are some RES integration
opportunities for which any of these three options is capable of providing the grid
capabilities needed at a lower cost than ESS. At the same time, ESS prices are
dropping and will continue to do so with the implementation of the CA mandate, while
ESS remains the most flexible and versatile integration resource available.
Furthermore, the substitute goods listed above “are ultimately limited in scale and
scope” (Denholm, 2012), while many of the ESS technologies coming to market are
modular and thus scalable to grid needs. The bottom line is that as the CA electricity
grid evolves, ESS will eventually become a cost effective option as the opportunities to
use cheaper substitute goods expire. Whether or not ESS will become cost-effective
before some of these substitutes depends largely upon the other factors that follow.
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4.2 Scenario Components
Energy Storage System Technology
The single most significant factor to consider in the construction of grid-deployment
scenarios is technology. Technology shifts have the potential to profoundly influence
any market, and the market for energy storage in CA is no different. A recent survey of
energy storage CEOs uncovered a general consensus; the probability is very high that
one or more disruptive technologies will be introduced to the energy storage industry
within the next five years (Munsell, 2013). Should ESS technology advance as rapidly
as these industry experts predict, the CA energy storage industry will be one that is
quite sensitive to technological change in its development. Although it is clearly difficult
to predict a “disruptive” technology, some characteristics that such a storage
technology may hold are identified.
Though all storage techniques aim to improve certain metrics – efficiency,
levelized cost of energy and power, etc. - certain types of storage technology are more
subject to technological change than others. While bulk storage and other
technologically simple load shifting techniques such as CAES and thermal energy
storage are unlikely to see notable technological advances due their maturity as well as
their physical limitations, emerging storage technologies – in particular, new types of
batteries – are poised for major improvements in coming years.
Bulk storage is currently much cheaper than battery storage for most
applications, but batteries have an advantage over many bulk storage systems in both
their operational flexibility and the fact that they are constrained by their current
technological state rather than geographic or physical factors (Kintner-Meyer, 2010) –
that is to say, there is a lot of room for improvement. In particular, battery storage is
well poised to control the market for small scale DES due to their high energy densities
and locational flexibilities (Rastler, 2010). Important areas for battery improvement
include:
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Safety
For any ESS that would be located with or near residential DG units, safety is the
primary concern. Battery technologies that have not shown that they can perform
safely without risk of fires or other hazardous events will not be installed at the
residential or community level. In particular, Lithium-Ion batteries are prone to
oxidization reactions and fires, and must undergo extensive and expensive safety
precautions before being ready for such an application (Hadjipaschalis et al., 2009).

Durability
One of the main limiting factors in achieving cost-effective battery storage is the short
life cycle of many of these technologies. A study found that increasing the life span of
batteries to be the most feasible way to increase the “energy stored on electrical
energy invested” (ESOI) ratios – the life-cycle energetic efficiency – of using these
devices (Barnhart et al., 2013), which is an important consideration in terms of
sustainability. Increased durability of these devices will similarly increase the return on
investment (ROI) of these devices, decreasing their LCOE over their lifespan and
improving cost-effectiveness (EPRI, 2013).

Materials
An important aspect of a successful battery technology will be the resources it uses to
store chemical charge. The choice of abundant resources to serve as the electrodes
and other components of batteries will contribute to the creation of technologies that
are both less expensive and more sustainable (Armand & Tarascon, 2008). This is one
advantage that metal-air batteries, such as Eos Energy’s zinc-air battery system, have
over batteries with high-efficiencies but that consume scarce and valuable resources
such as lithium.
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Energy Capacity
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, a disruptive battery storage technology will be
one that is capable of providing a high energy capacity as well as the high power
capacity that they are currently valued for. Only when battery technologies that are
currently deployed primarily as limited energy storage resources (LESR) become
capable of providing energy to the grid for long durations with an LCOE comparable to
that of traditional generation will energy storage systems become a truly viable
replacement for FTG.
These operational characteristics are those of a technology that could prove
disruptive to the energy storage industry as a whole. Perhaps most importantly, an
ESS technology that is truly “disruptive” in terms of changing not only the applications
for which storage is cost-effective but also expanding the ones that it is technologically
capable of providing will need to be able to cheaply store electricity for long periods of
time. In addition, a technology that could achieve significant enough market penetration
to replace FTG and corner the market for DES in the state of CA must be safe,
durable, and sourced from cheap, sustainable materials in order to gain acceptance
from a social and a fiscal standpoint. If such a technology is modular or highly scalable
in some other way, then opportunities could open up not just for DES but for larger
grid-scale applications as well.

CA Electricity Market Factors
The CA electricity market is not an isolated system but rather is intricately connected to
and influenced by developments in the economic, political and social sphere at both
the state and the federal level. In addition to the potential for disruptive technological
change, developments in the US energy sector as a whole that could influence the
economic viability of ESS on the CA electricity grid. Table 4 on the following page
outlines some of the major factors considered in the scenarios to follow.
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Table 4: Major Factors considered in Scenario Construction.
Energy

At both the state and the federal level, the regulatory environment

Storage

remains ambiguous for emerging storage technologies. The FERC,

Policy

CAISO and other relevant institutions are in the midst of developing the
“rules” that will govern and shape energy storage market prospects as
well as the nature of its deployment in CA.

Renewables As ESS are primarily a complementary good to whatever generation
Mix

exists on an electricity grid, the nature of the facilities that are creating
the energy to be stored will have a profound effect on the value
propositions of an ESS on the grid. In particular, the balance between
wind and solar penetration under the RPS will affect the energy storage
industry.

Electricity

Figure 8 identified the market potential for an energy storage industry in

Pricing

California. By far, the most significant potential value stream (at over $4

Schemes

billion for 2004-2014) was time-of-use energy cost management. This
value stream will not be unlocked without the implementation of pricing
schemes that more appropriately reflect the costs of energy production.

Utility

The traditional utility business model has its roots in the 20th century

Influence

energy sector paradigm of a small number of large power plants,
connected by large transmission lines, providing most of the electricity to
the grid. Utilities are politically powerful entities, and as many of the
profit opportunities of utilities are stranded with this paradigm, they may
resist the evolution of distributed generation and the distributed storage
to come with it.

Commercial

The ability of third parties to develop a “standard model” for procurement

Adoption

of ESS towards specified applications and thereby bypass regulatory
concerns and other uncertainties will greatly influence overall adoption
of ESS. Residential solar systems and Ice Energy’s thermal energy
storage systems are good examples of this.

63

4.3 Energy Storage Deployment Scenarios
4.3.1 Baseline Scenario
The first scenario that is important to consider is what could be called the “baseline”
scenario. In this model, little technological change occurs for either energy storage or
renewable technologies. The amount of renewables on the grid increases past the 33%
RPS target, but the composition of these RES remains roughly the same with wind
providing the majority of the energy to meet RPS compliance standards. Wind facilities
face an increasing threat of curtailment due to both inadequate transmission and the
threat of over-generation during certain periods of the year (Hawkins et al., 2007). The
1.325 GW of storage is installed by 2024, but as no disruptive, highly scalable ESS
technology with high energy capacity comes into play, this storage is deployed mainly
to fill in niche applications. Significantly, because the mandate requires procurement of
only 1.325 MW of storage but places no duration requirement on these resources, we
can feasibly envision such a world where “utilities that don’t want to spend a lot of
money on this obtain a lot of low [energy] capacity resources” (Schlosberg, personal
communication, November 2013). On this electricity grid, storage has three main
economical value propositions:
1) Provision of Ancillary Services, in particular Frequency Regulation, to markets
that have come to accept quick and responsive LESRs as the most appropriate
technology for this purpose, due to their flexibility.
2) Thermal Energy Storage will continue to provide a cheap load-shifting technique
to account for excess off-peak energy from wind and other resources.
3) Bulk storage for an increasing amount of wind energy that continues to have
high output during off-peak hours.
Energy storage fills some important grid needs in this scenario, but these will really
only constitute niche applications. Wind power in CA is characterized by high
production levels during the night and is almost completely non coincident with peak or
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even medium levels of demand due to the fact that “wind speeds are greatest when
system demand is lowest” (Hennessy et al., 2005). A proliferation of wind powered
RES would necessitate, and thereby create value streams for, ESS with large energy
capacities and the ability to store energy for long periods of time. Without technological
advances in energy capacity, however, these value streams go unfulfilled because at
the moment “only two technologies—pumped hydroelectric storage and compressed
air energy storage (CAES)—are cost-effective at the large temporal scales (several
hours to days) needed to complement wind energy” (Greenblatt et al., 2007). Without
considerable storage on the system, transmission constraints become increasingly
problematic in terms of both curtailment of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and
meeting local capacity needs of certain areas.
Certain RES whose nature or location lend themselves to cost-effective storage,
especially Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) facilities, will procure on-site storage
capabilities in order to increase their capacity payments or to reduce curtailment. In
particular, RES facilities large enough to create the economies of scale necessary to
justify on-site bulk storage, such as Tehachapi wind farm, will install ESS in the form of
large scale batteries or CAES, where feasible geologically feasible. Significant market
potential will be created for demand response (DR) and other load-shifting alternatives
such as thermal energy storage (TES). TES for the offset of peak electricity demand
from air conditioning is already one of the most economically viable applications on the
grid and will continue to be used, but only to the extent that a market exists for this
single use application.
A recent CPUC report stated that there is a great need on the CA electricity grid
for local, transmission-constrained capacity while there is in fact excess capacity for
the system as a whole (Energy Division & Policy and Planning Division, 2013). This
would suggest a higher value of storage facilities located closer to load, but no
technology comes into play that will allow such deployment in this scenario. The lack of
a technology that allows retail customers to cost-effectively manage their electricity
time-of-use means that a huge potential value stream goes unfulfilled in this scenario,
even if dynamic TOU pricing is introduced. The flexibility of the high power capacity
resources added to the grid and used for certain Ancillary Services means that some of
65

the most marginal peaking plants will be made unnecessary, but Flexible Thermal
Generation (FTG) will largely still be needed to address the fact that much of the
energy produced under RPS does not match peak demand levels. More transmission
will need to be constructed in order to connect the large peaking plants that will be
needed to meet load, as well as for the large wind generation plants that produce
energy at night. Overall, storage is not located or operated in a way that optimizes its
potential to enhance grid efficiency in this scenario.

4.3.2 “Big Shifters”
This scenario envisions the development of a battery storage technology that could
store large amounts of energy for a long time, but needed to appeal to economies of
scale at the MW level to do so. This technology would likely be a large, grid-scale type
battery of the type envisioned by Eos Energy Storage, which produces containerized,
MW scale metal-air batteries. It is assumed that technological advances in PV allow
RES to shift slightly towards solar up until 2016, at which point growth slows due to the
retirement of the investment tax credit (ITC) that currently funds up to 30% of PV
systems costs. This is consistent with the findings of a recent study that the costs of
distributed solar will decline through 2016, but then rise significantly in 2017 and not
return to pre-2016 levels until after 2020 (Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc.,
2012). This has the potential to put a dent in the growth of solar PV as an industry, and
could mean that growth slows considerably after 2016, allowing wind to fill in the
“compliance gaps” left as per compliance with the RPS. The result is a grid that obtains
a slightly higher proportion of its energy from solar generation than at the moment, but
that still leans heavily on wind generation.
On the regulatory side of things, the CPUC develops an asset class for energy
storage technology and allows it to become eligible as capacity for procurement by
utilities under their Resource Adequacy requirements. This is a likely development
considering the recent order by the CPUC that SCE procure at least 50 MW of energy
storage resources in the Los Angeles basin, a development that “provides a much
needed market signal that energy storage will be considered as a key asset class to
help California address its long term local reliability needs” (“California Requiring”,
2013).
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This scenario has several important implications for the CA electricity grid. It will
enable the development of “microgrids” that can temporally manage energy use within
a certain timeframe. These pockets of local reliability will be much less reliant on the
grid as a whole and will have greatly enhanced local capacity and reliability, which the
CPUC has stated as an urgent need of the CA electricity grid (Energy Policy and
Planning Division, 2013). This ability to stagger demand between these “microgrids”
also greatly reduces the need for transmission and distribution upgrades, because the
need for instantaneous delivery of energy to the grid as a whole will be buffered to
some extent. It is unclear who might own these facilities, but they will be highly
attractive to both merchant vendors and utilities. When utilities consider procurement of
grid assets, “the first rule of project development is site control” (Desmond, personal
communication, November 2013), so it is clear that they would prefer for a storage unit
to be under their ownership and control. Analysis would suggest, however, that
creation of centralized, utility-owned storage facilities is not the socially optimal way to
structure energy storage capacity on the grid; one study found that merchant owned
and operated storage facilities would provide the greatest welfare benefits in terms of
price reduction (Sioshansi, 2010).
Though dynamic TOU residential pricing has not been implemented in the “Big
Shifters” scenario, these devices would still be able to achieve some load-shifting
value. Under a merchant scenario, this would be achieved by merchants obtaining
large amounts of energy from the grid at cheap wholesale off-peak prices and then
offering it for sale to nearby end-users at a price lower than the utilities’, but still at a
profit. If the storage was utility owned, the utility could simply “charge” these storage
facilities during off-peak hours and use them to provide power to localized areas during
what would normally be on-peak hours, allowing them to defer expensive investments
in FTG and transmission. Storage will help greatly reduce overall system costs in the
“Big Shifter” scenario, but a large value proposition is lost due to faulty policy that
continues to improperly incentivize residential electricity consumers and fails to
encourage optimal storage use.
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4.3.3 Solar Solution
The third scenario envisions an explosion of solar RES on the CA electricity grid, with
storage technologies evolving as a “Solar Solution” to the challenges produced by this
a trend. Solar powered RES have been found to be fairly coincident with peak demand
at low penetration rates (Denholm et al., 2007), while even at higher penetration rates
solar PV production misses areas of peak demand by only a few hours. ESS to be
paired specifically with solar technologies will require less energy capacity, needing to
store the electricity for only a matter of a couple of hours or less. This seems to be a
feasible direction for storage technologies to evolve, given the current concentration of
energy storage companies on power capacity, as opposed to energy capacity (Munsell,
2013), as well as the findings of one cost-effectiveness study that concluded “storage
system duration of 2 hours exceeded cost - effectiveness of 4 hours” (EPRI, 2013). In
this scenario, these devices would not need to appeal significantly to economies of
scale to operate cost-effectively, but there may be few reasons to deploy them at a
scale lower than the MW level as they would still look to more well-developed ancillary
services (AS) markets for a significant portion of their profits. These markets would
include the option for utilities to procure ESS ancillary service “capabilities” on a multiyear ahead market similar to the way that utilities fulfill “Resource Adequacy”
requirements.
“Solar Solution” is a probable scenario in that solar power certainly seems to
have a promising future in California. FERC Chairman John Wellinghoff recently stated
his belief that solar “is growing so fast that it is going to overtake everything” (Trabish,
2013). The “Golden State” has witnessed an explosion in the growth of its solar
industry due to a combination of technological advances and incentive schemes.
Figure 9 on the following page displays the impressive growth in distributed generation
(DG) solar energy as a result of the California Solar Initiative (CSI).
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Figure 9: Growth in CA Solar Energy under California Solar Initiative
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Grid-connected PV is undergoing exponential growth across the country, and
particularly in CA where the amount of capacity (in MW) installed in 2011 increased by
fully 110% from that installed in 2010 (Sherwood, 2012). As Figure 9 shows, residential
PV systems are very much following this trend in California. Policy seems to be on
solar’s side as well in California, with the recently passed AB327 removing the
proposed cap on net metering programs in CA (Hales, 2013a). The decision will lend
more confidence to third party solar companies and further strength an industry that
seems poised to continue its impressive growth in the state of CA. The very passage
and nature of AB327 indicate the growing economic and political power of the solar
community in CA. As Carrie Cullen Hitt, senior vice president of state affairs for the
Solar Energy Industry Association, was quoted, AB 327 is a sign that solar energy is
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“now a significant part of the economy and that's why you see all this [legislative]
activity.” (Carus, 2013).
The actual deployment of storage on the “Solar Solution” grid would not be
significantly different from that of the Baseline scenario, but that is due more to the lack
of disruptive change in ESS technology than any other factors. Due to the fact that
most ESS on this grid would be incapable of shifting load past a couple of hours, one
of its primary value propositions would remain the Ancillary services markets. For this
reason, it would make little sense to deploy ESS scaled lower than the MW level, as
resources smaller than 500kW would not be able to bid into these markets (FERC,
2010). The results of a recent CPUC use-case study found that the Frequency
Regulation and the Spinning Reserve markets provide significant financial
remuneration to such Limited Energy Storage Resources (LESR) (EPRI, 2013). The
slight increases in energy capacity under this scenario would allow this storage
technology to dominate these AS markets, replacing the need for any FTG that would
have served this need.
Ancillary services are a niche market, however, and once sufficient storage
capacity was installed to fill them there would likely be few value propositions left for
low-energy storage systems. The large-scale deployment of PV would help the usecases for this type of storage as a technology able to increase the capacity value of
solar generation, thanks to its limited load shifting capability. As a scalable resource,
these ESS would be able to be applied to the transmission and distribution system
roughly in a way that roughly mimicked the composition of renewable energy sources,
and could thus help shift load by the several hours that would likely be necessary for a
grid with so many PV generation facilities. Bulk storage would still be applied for most
load-shifting purposes for wind and resources other than solar, however, due to the
inability of this technology to shift energy by a significant temporal factor.
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4.3.4 “Sponge Grid”
The fourth scenario, “Sponge Grid”, entails the most technological change. Under this
scenario, solar PV costs continue to drop significantly enough to offset the expiration of
subsidies, while the energy storage industry sees a major breakthrough in a highly
modular technology that can store energy for long periods of time without appealing to
economics of scale to do so. This makes for a grid that can “absorb” energy at
numerous points spread evenly through the system, like a sponge. The prohibition of
mandatory time-of-use (TOU) rates for residential customers expires in 2018, at which
point the CPUC takes advantage of the authority it was recently granted by AB327 to
establish statewide, dynamic TOU rates (Carus, 2013). The CPUC further addresses
its noted need for local capacity (Energy Policy & Planning Division, 2012) by
incentivizing the deployment of the 12,000 MW of distributed generation that Governor
Brown has stated as policy goal by 2020 (Trabish, 2012). Third-party ownership
models are created that expedite the installation of both DG solar PV and this new,
modular storage technology, and many home owners install this technology in order to
take advantage of the pricing disparities created by TOU pricing. “Smart grid”
technology allows electricity consumers to become much more responsive to electricity
prices, partially mitigating the inelasticity of demand noted of 20th century electricity
consumers (Borenstein, 2009).
As a good that is complementary to whatever RES exists on the market, more
distributed generation (DG) means more potential for distributed energy storage (DES).
Eric Carlson, lead architect of energy systems at SolarCity (a residential PV installer,
which recently installed its first 100 energy storage systems) was recently quoted
asserting “storage will be absolutely necessary to enable the deployment of solar
across the grid at extremely high penetrations" (Lacey, 2013a). A study of PV
penetration levels in modern electricity grids reinforces this belief, finding that largescale deployment of DG PV technologies – on the order of provision of 50% of a
system’s energy needs – would require a “radical transformation of the electricity
system—from a centrally controlled to a highly distributed and interactive system”
involving DES as well as other smart grid features (Denholm & Margolis, 2007b). While
50% is a large number, recall that solar PV capacity value can drop by as much as two
thirds when solar PV reaches market penetration of 10% on an energy basis, due to
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non coincidence with peak demand (Mills, 2013). This scale of PV deployment,
especially distributed PV, would create a need for ESS and other capacity increasing
technologies.
Although solar PV currently accounts for only .9% of California’s annual
electricity consumption (Nyberg, 2013), much more significant deployment may not be
so far off if the exponential growth rates currently observed in that California residential
PV market continue. The installations of solar PV under the CSI have accounted for a
percentage of total CA electricity usage that has grown at approximately 75.2% a year.
Should this type of growth continue in California, distributed PV alone could account for
4.1% of California’s total energy consumption, as early as 2016 (Appendix 3). Though
the CSI program has nearly run out of funding in CA (Trabish, 2012), federal incentives
for residential solar are set to extend through the year 2016 (Sherwood, 2012), which
provides a level of certainty that this type of growth will continue at least through that
year.
This scenario assumes that the commercial, third party solar installation
companies become strong enough to survive and flourish through 2016 and beyond.
Even three years before the scheduled termination of these subsidies, the distributed
solar PV industry is showing signs of robust growth independent of government
incentives, due largely to “falling component and transaction costs.” (Grueneich et al.,
2013). In the first quarter of 2013 alone, 71.3 MW of capacity were installed in the form
of residential systems, and 18.5% of that capacity was installed without the support of
any state-level incentives whatsoever (Kann, 2013). This is an enormous advance for
an industry that has traditionally relied heavily on state incentives and other types of
subsidies to sustain itself, and is a good sign that DG is on the cusp of a major
explosion in California.
An important trend to note is the increasing amount of distributed residential PV
systems that have been procured under a third party ownership model. This model
accounts for the falling transaction costs of installation for residential customers. The
percentage of residential systems installed under such an ownership model has
increased more than fivefold in only 3 years, skyrocketing from 14% in 2009 to 72% in
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2012 (Loewen et al., 2012). Dropping component costs paired with such innovative
third-party ownership models mean that an increasing number of residential PV
installations are being completed without any funding from the CSI, as the few hundred
dollars available to installers of residential PV systems have become “insignificant”
(Sherwood, 2012). “Sponge grid” sees a similar third party ownership model develop
for the new, scalable storage technology that enables electricity customers to take a
high level of control over their energy use. The commercial sector has already begun
uptake of energy storage, with SolarCity recently pairing with Tesla Motors in a
contract that will see the two companies working to develop a “service [that] will use a
combination of solar panels, big batteries and advanced software to cut utility bills for
clients” (Baker, 2013).
The benefits of this storage deployment scenario to the electricity grid as a
whole are enormous. Local capacity concerns are addressed, increasing local reliability
and mitigating the need to address these concerns through the construction of new
transmission lines. Locating storage near both DG and load means that load can be
balanced within “microgrids”, largely mitigating the need for ancillary services. Placing
storage close to load would reduce losses of energy during transmission as well, which
typically run from 3-5% but can exceed 20% during peak periods of congestion
(Casten, 2013). Peak load would essentially become nonexistent, as customers would
take advantage of dynamic TOU rates by programming their residential storage to
simply absorb energy when prices were lowest, and perhaps even to sell energy back
to the grid when prices were high. Overall, the pricing disparity between periods would
decrease, because only the lowest marginal cost resources would ever be brought
online to provide electricity, as dictated by consumer demand. Low electricity prices
could threaten some of the value propositions for these devices, as noted in section
3.5, but once ESS becomes an established grid asset and no longer a novelty, it will
likely be there to stay.
DES seems to hold much promise in the state of California, especially in light of
the state’s ambitious environmental goals, the proliferation of DG resources, and the
stated need for local, rather than system capacity by the CPUC. If enough
decentralized energy storage is implemented it will challenge the operational balance
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paradigm upon which the current electricity grid is based, creating a scenario where
homes or communities could simply charge their storage facilities when energy is
inexpensively available, rather than having utilities and public entities racing to
constantly match generation with demand. Table 5 below outlines the four scenarios,
contrasting them against the attributes of the storage technology that becomes
dominant, for side-by-side comparison.
Table 5: Energy Storage Deployment Scenarios, by Technology Attributes

Economies of Scale
Baseline Scenario

“Big Shifters”

Primarily wind on the grid,

Eos style, high energy

more transmission, big

capacity MW scale storage.

losses from curtailment.

Offsets peakers and new

LESRs dominate Ancillary

transmission lines, shifts load

Services, some bulk storage

and reduces curtailment.

employed for wind load

Increased local capacity and

shifting.

opens door for deployment of
DG.

“Solar Solution”

“Sponge Grid”

Cheap, scalable storage, but

Cheap, low economy of scale,

not load shifting. DES would

storage that can shift load.

only be necessary at

Commercially deployed at

extremely high penetration

residential scale, huge TOU

levels of PV or DG. Storage

value created, large system

still primarily valued for AS.

efficiency gains.

Modular, Distributed
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Chapter 5: Recommendations for California
The CA electricity sector will face a period of unprecedented change in coming
decades as the grid undergoes a transformation that is a physical manifestation of the
changing paradigm of energy use in our Golden State. The successful evolution of the
current grid to one that is capable of absorbing clean electricity and shifting it
temporally will require well-informed and stringent policy to guide its progress – the
California deregulation crisis was an example of what can happen when significant
change in the structure of the electricity market is not accompanied by appropriate
policy. A new market design will be necessary to govern this transformed electricity
system, and it is “likely that it will contain a significantly higher level of regulation and
administrative intervention” (Beckman, 2013). Though government agencies will
necessarily play a role in restructuring such an essential sector of our state’s economy,
they will need to enlist the help of both the utilities and a robust clean energy private
sector to implement the goals and visions of their policies. It is essential that policy
surrounding the deployment of ESS and other aspects of the “smart grid” be well
informed in order to appropriately guide the private sector’s actions. In this chapter,
some recommendations are provided for the state as it moves forward with this exciting
transformation.

5.1 Barriers to Address
5.1.1 Technical
Some of the issues confronting ESS are a simple matter of the disparity between the
technological capabilities of modern grid assets and those of the grid itself: ESS
represent an advanced, 21st century technology that is being applied to a 20th century
grid. There is a consequent lack of certainty about the interconnection process of ESS
onto the grid and into the electricity markets. Some of these issues include:

•

A grid that was constructed for one-way flows of electricity rather than the two-way
flows of energy that ESS will create, and the difficulties in maintaining a balanced
system without the necessary metering (Ferber, 2013).
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•

Market dispatch software that is unable to account for ESS operational features
such as the speed of dispatch, their ability to specify a negative minimum operating
point, and the possibility to be dispatched as both regulation up and regulation
down (Tretheway, 2010).

•

Lack of a technology capable of coordinating and netting the capacity value of
distributed LESRs together for sale as Resource Adequacy or on future Capacity
markets (Tretheway, 2010).

•

Inability of ISO metering systems to measure the performance of LESR with quick
responsiveness (NY ISO, 2010).

The installation of more advanced information technology at various locations within
the grid will assist with the deployment of technologies such as ESS that require
advanced and intricate operational strategies and signals to operate in a maximally
efficient manner. Smart meters will be an absolutely essential aspect of any successful
deployment of distributed energy storage (DES) for the purposes of grid efficiency.
California has already recognized the value of such “smart grid” technology, and the
CPUC has accordingly required that the CA IOUs install smart meters at the location of
all end-users of electricity by 2020, with nearly 10 million already installed (“Smart Grid
Report” – 2012, 2013). This will make for a grid that is significantly more receptive to
ESS and other 21st century technologies.

5.1.2 Stakeholder Resistance
The energy industry has not traditionally been the most dynamic or receptive to
change. A “game-changer” technology will be met with some resistance from
stakeholders throughout the energy industry, resulting in inertial forces that could work
against the deployment of energy storage on the grid despite the force of the mandate
and the potentially high value of ESS to the grid as a whole.

Risk Averse Utilities
The regulatory and economic space in which utilities currently reside “penalizes
innovation and risk-taking activities by utilities” because in order to be ensured their
reasonable rate of return on investment, they must invest in assets that will be “used
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and useful” (Grueneich et al., 2013). This, in addition to the fact that the
“reasonableness” of a utility investment is assessed after-the-fact, means that utilities
have little reason to pursue emerging technologies when they are ensured a profit
margin by sticking with the energy sector status quo.

Skeptical Third Party Investors
Lack of commercial operating experience can often prove a catch-22 for emerging
technologies projects such as energy storage when trying to gain capital investment.
Potential financiers often require demonstrated commercial success before investing
money with a project, but no commercial projects will be deployed until a sufficient
amount of venture capital can be raised. The procurement mandate has addressed this
uncertainty by essentially guaranteeing a market for the earliest grid scale ESS
deployments, ones that would likely otherwise be viewed as financially risky projects.
The mandate will already largely address this issue by ensuring the development of at
least some commercial storage projects, as well as promoting a “learn-by-doing”
approach to the development of viable market opportunities. These investors will likely
also be put off by the complex bidding strategies that may be required to optimize the
value of energy storage devices in a market context (Gyuk, 2011).

Uninformed Electricity Consumers
Electricity prices are a very politically charged and sensitive issue in California.
Because most consumers have little idea where their electricity comes from but rather
only see a bill at the end of each month, it is sometimes difficult to accept changes in
electricity pricing. Due to their distant relationship with customers and their links with
the public sector, utilities can come to be viewed as government entities trying to take
undue control over electricity use. Electricity use is something that many customers
have come to view as a right rather than a good that they consume, so when they see
a larger bill without any explanation they will resist this change.
Although part of this amounts to true resistance against utility attempts to take
more control over electricity use, a recent Sacramento Municipal Utility District pilot
program for dynamic pricing hypothesized that consumer resistance is more “inertia”
than anything, noting that while 20% of people who were given the option decided not
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to enroll in the program from the start, nearly 90% of those who were automatically
enrolled in the program stayed in it (Herter, 2013). This inertia will likely be easier to
address than straight out resistance to changes in pricing schemes, and educating
customers about the environmental effects of their energy use may help them to
become more receptive.

5.1.3 Market Structure
ESS are currently at a major disadvantage to other grid assets when it comes to
achieving project remuneration through the energy markets in CA. Storage
technologies must compete in prejudiced markets against alternate technologies that
these markets have been explicitly constructed for. This makes it difficult for ESS to
gain adequate compensation over a project lifetime to provide a leveled cost of energy
(LCOE) or power (LCOP) that is competitive with that of potential substitutes. Some of
the major issues with the current wholesale electricity market structure include:

•

Poor understanding of ESS capabilities: No firm numbers have been established as
a basis for understanding ESS capabilities to provide grid services such as
capacity. Better accounting will allow ESS to become eligible for the provision and
compensation of more grid services. In particular, California is developing a process
to understand ESS Resource Adequacy capabilities.

•

Poorly constructed price signals (wholesale): Basic market structure that does not
explicitly value ESS capabilities.

•

Lack of cohesive regulatory framework: Uncertainty on the regulatory level makes it
difficult to formulate optimization strategies for ESS.

•

No Long Term Contracts: At the moment, prospective ESS depend entirely upon
spot markets such as the energy and ancillary services markets to fund their
projects – there is no upfront funding for such services as there are for long-term
power purchase agreements (PPA) with generators. (Lin, 2011). The uncertainty
inherent in such an arrangement makes it difficult to promote ESS as a sound
investment, especially in a highly risk-averse energy market environment. A longterm contract for regulation services, similar to the ones used by utilities to ensure
resource adequacy with conventional generation, would help overcome this
significant market barrier (Lin, 2011).
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Price Signals (retail)
The wholesale electricity markets need improvement, but the state of the retail
electricity market is perhaps even more prohibitive to potential energy storage value
streams. The paradigm of cheap electricity as a right, combined with the political risks
involved with opposing this status quo, have made for a regulatory and policy
environment in the CA energy sector that favors cheap electricity. The prices that endusers on the CA electricity grid see today are not an accurate representation of the true
social cost of producing it, nor do they truly reflect even the purely economic costs of
production. The two main flaws with the current pricing schemes are that 1) they fail to
internalize the social costs of electricity production, and 2) they do not reflect the
marginal cost of the energy consumed by any given end-user.
Recall from Figure 8 that TOU energy management was found to be the single
greatest potential value stream of energy storage applications in California. At the
moment however, there is very little incentive for any residential purchasers of energy
on the retail markets to manage their energy use temporally because the current
structure of electricity contracts are not time-variant. These contracts effectively
subsidize electricity for peak users by overcharging consumers who purchase
electricity only when the costs of balancing supply with load are relatively low. On the
other hand, dynamic rates reduce overall system costs by inducing customers to
reduce electricity use during peak hours reducing the need for expensive peaking
plants.
A lot can be said about the inefficiencies inherent in a flat rate, and even in basic
tiered electricity pricing systems, but in the 20th century the reality was that the
information necessary to implement more accurate pricing systems simply could not be
obtained. With the advent of the “smart grid” and advanced metering, however, there
no longer remains any justification for these rates. As Lee Friedman puts it:
“Time - invariant rates are a historical anachronism, a system of grossly
inefficient subsidies and penalties that no longer has a legitimate basis for continuation.
It seems unconscionable for us to continue to subsidize peak - load consumption when
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its social costs are so great, and to penalize off - peak consumption when it holds so
much promise as a method of environmental improvement.” (Friedman, 2009).

5.2 Recommendations
5.2.1 Send Appropriate Price Signals
The implementation of appropriate pricing systems will unlock massive potential for
value creation in reduced electricity prices, as well as in the mitigation of unnecessary
social costs in terms of both environmental degradation and an inefficiently costly
electricity grid. Cost-effective energy storage would be one very promising means of
realizing that potential by empowering energy users to take much greater control over
the prices they paid for their electricity, with their desired time of consumption having
much less bearing on this decision.
When electricity prices are crafted in such a way that end-users face strong
incentives to use energy at times when the marginal system costs of electricity
production are low, it can benefit both the utility and its customers. For example, the
thermal energy storage systems employed by Ice Energy to shift air conditioning
electricity use to the night time profit from the time-differential prices seen by large
electricity users in the state, while the local utility is able to reduce their peak capacity
needs thanks to this shift. Though TOU measures have been implemented for
Commercial and Industrial (C&I) customers in CA, however, even the tiered pricing
system employed by the state is merely a rough approximation of temporal change in
marginal cost of energy production. Generally speaking, the more closely a pricing
system can induce customers to shape their electricity usage patterns based on realtime marginal system costs, the more benefits will be created for the electricity grid as
a whole. A comprehensive case study of dozens of utilities across the country found
that pricing systems which “dynamically track system capacity and cost conditions”
were most effective in achieving goals like reduction of peak demand and local
capacity constraint (Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc., 2005). This study
further found that when pricing programs produced net benefits to the system as a
whole, contracts could be constructed in such a way that both a utility and its
customers saw a share of the benefits.
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Friedman suggests a “two-part tariff” as a basis for a new, more socially efficient
electricity pricing mechanism. Under such a tariff, a consumer’s electricity bill would
consist of two parts. The first part would be a “fixed charge” that was calculated to
reflect the services that the customer received simply by virtue of being connected to
the grid – transmission lines, the capacity of the grid to provide electricity when they
want it, etc. This fixed charge could be applied on a tiered system to allay equity
concerns. The second part of the bill would be a “usage charge” that was calculated
considering both the amount of electricity consumed and the true marginal cost to the
system of actually producing that energy (Friedman, 2009). AB 327 authorizes IOUs to
employ a “fixed rate” charge of up to $10 per month, in order to enable cost recovery of
fixed costs (Cares, 2013). Though this may reduce incentives for energy efficiency and
net energy use reduction in the immediate future, it could also be an important step
towards such a “two part tariff” electricity pricing scheme that more accurately
represents the costs of grid services provided to end-users.
In implementing these systems, it is important that electricity customers are on
board. A very promising recent study conducted by SMUD emphasized the positive
aspects of the new pricing plan such as savings during off-peak hours to customers,
while dense terms like “critical peak” and “load shifting” were left for the utility experts
(Herter, 2013). Names like Optimum Off-Peak and Summer Weekday Value Plan were
given to the new programs. These strategies are effective but not disingenuous;
creating better rate structures truly present an opportunity for multiple parties to benefit,
and this study simply demonstrates that utilities will be more successful in doing so if
they make the transition as simple as possible for customers. Volunteer programs like
this one are a good start, but they only attract energy users who save without altering
their electricity usage patterns. To truly have an effect on system costs, it will be
necessary to implement mandatory, dynamic time-of-use pricing that will more
accurately incentivize socially advantageous energy use and penalize those who
choose not to adjust to the needs of our society, thus “reducing overall costs and fairly
allocating those higher costs” (Bender et al., 2005). California has taken notable steps
towards doing so in allowing the CPUC to begin implementing mandatory TOU rates
beginning in 2018, as per AB 327 (Carus, 2013).
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5.2.2 Equitable Wholesale Energy Market Design
The California energy markets need to be restructured in such a way that they more
appropriately reflect the physical realities of, and the consequent problems faced by,
the grid. More explicit value must be assigned to factors such as location and
dispatchability in addition to the $/MWh metric currently used for most wholesale
prices. In creating this new market design, it is important that a democratic process
involving all stakeholders is used to ensure that all viewpoints and values are taken
into account.

Public Good Subsidization
Not all of the benefits provided to society by the deployment of energy storage are
easily quantifiable, but research is being conducted towards this goal. The
quantification of benefits is essential to the establishment of policies that will create the
socially efficient amount of storage on the California electricity grid. Though the positive
externalities produced by storage systems justify subsidies or the “design of market
mechanisms or contracts that compensate storage owners for the external eﬀects of
their storage use” (Sioshansi, 2010), in order to set those incentives to the right level,
policymakers must know the amount of value that the policy will create. Once all value
streams of a storage system are known and quantified, policymakers can proceed in
establishing appropriate policies.
Section 3.5 outlines some of the system benefits that would justify such a
subsidy. Under the mandate, the CPUC did not agree to assign “a public value to an
agreed upon list of benefits … [because] there is no standard value that is appropriate
for all storage technologies” (CPUC, 2013). This is not important because the
technologies deployed under the mandate will not need subsidization, given the
backing from the mandate itself. As an energy storage industry develops, however it
will be important to apply such a public good value to storage technologies to allow
them to become competitive with substitute goods. Figure 10 on the following page
provides an illustrative example of how the socially optimal level of energy storage willn
be reached only through application of incentives.
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Figure 10: The Need for Energy Storage Incentives

Source: Strategen Consulting, 2011.

More appropriate incentives for generation.
Production tax credits and renewable energy credits are granted regardless of time or
location, meaning that “current incentives for renewable energy are leading to suboptimal capital allocation” (Casten, 2013). Renewable energy producers are paid on a
$/MWh basis so that even if the energy is produced at a time when the market would
usually tell a facility not to produce, a renewable energy producer will continue to so
because they are blindly subsidized by these incentive structures. These figures should
be altered so that they incentivize renewable production that serves grid needs, as well
as services, such as energy storage, that enable local capacity needs to be met
through the use of renewable energy.

Invest in local energy systems first
California should create a market that concentrates on meeting load with local
resources. This will help address the local capacity needs identified by the CPUC,
which could be met quite effectively through the creation of “microgrids” as in the “Big
Shifters” scenario. Though transporting electricity long distances makes sense when
generators are bidding expensive energy with differing marginal costs, this makes less
economic sense as an increasing amount of energy comes from zero marginal cost
RES. Currently Distributed Generation is compensated through Net Metering and other
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incentive programs, but in the long run these should be replaced with markets that are
more receptive to smaller resources and “that pay DG….customers for all the value
they provide, whether it is capacity, energy, transmission and distribution congestion
relief, ancillary services, greenhouse gas reductions, or emission reductions” (Bender
et al., 2005).

Develop a multi-year ahead “capabilities” market
Much in the same way that Resource Adequacy markets value the potential ability of a
project to provide capacity to a utility, when needed, a market should be developed in
which utilities can pay potential ESS project developers for the services they will be
able to provide like ramping, load following, and regulation (Casey, 2013).

Develop Standard Contracts for ESS projects
The development and authorization of standard contracts for ESS project developers
(accounting for the differences between technologies, of course) would greatly
streamline the procurement process for all parties involved and would likely result in
much greater uptake of ESS, where applicable. California energy markets are presided
over by many different regulatory agencies at both the state and federal level. Project
procurement should be streamlined to account for “gaps and overlaps” between these
agencies that can be difficult to navigate for potential project developers (Grueneich et
al., 2013). The California feed-in tariff allows eligible customer-generators to enter into
10-, 15- or 20-year standard contracts with utilities electricity. A similar system could be
implemented to allow storage project owners to provide “energy services” such as load
shifting and ancillary services to grid for the entirety of their useful life.
This strategy worked incredibly well for the residential solar market, where an
explosion in the number of residential PV in the past five years is largely “due to the
increased popularity of third party ownership models in the residential solar market”
(Loewen et al., 2012). Unfortunately, as far as the scope of the mandate, the CPUC did
“not require the IOUs to develop standard contracts” (CPUC, 2013). By the time the
mandate has expired, however, the ESS industry will have developed significantly from
its current state, and it would be wise to encourage the development of standard
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contracts in a way so as to allow the market to take over easily. This is particularly true
if one or several types of technologies come to dominate the market.

Clear Rules for ESS
Developing an asset class for different types of storage, in the relevant markets, would
make it much easier for potential projects to identify potential value streams. See the
NY ISO Case Study below for a good example of how this can be achieved.

Case Study: New York Regulation Market
The NY ISO has undertaken an initiative to make their Ancillary Services markets more
receptive to new energy non-generator grid assets such as ESS. The ISO addressed
this issue within its Regulation Service market by creating a new category of
Regulation Service providers, LESR’s, which is “characterized by its ability to provide
continuous six-second changes in output coupled with its inability to sustain continuous
operation at maximum energy withdrawal or maximum energy injection for an hour.”
(NY ISO, 2010). These providers are limited to providing regulation services, but are
paid in the same manner – at the market-clearing price – as other resources. This is a
good example of how avenues for cost recovery of storage technologies can be
implemented into current market structures. Other adjustments made by the NY ISO to
incorporate storage included market software adjustments, real time dispatch (RTD)
adjustments to allow the evaluation of various LESR devices to receive or provide
electricity, and Automated Generation Control (AGC) software to allow LESR’s to be
the first resource dispatched so as to take advantage of their extremely responsive
nature (Lin et al., 2010). By removing the requirement of providing energy and allowing
LESR’s to provide pure regulation services, the NY ISO has “been able to create a
market for a new class of resources” (NY ISO 2010) in a way that will enable LESRs to
be used cost-effectively in one of their most relevant grid applications.

5.2.3 Enlist Utilities
As was examined in section 2.2, the role traditionally played by utilities is shrinking as
the energy use paradigm shifts away from cheap energy as a right, and towards
electricity as a product with a cost that reflects its true social costs of its production.
This shift has also created an equally important, if fundamentally different, role for an
entity that can monitor and regulate energy use, ensure efficiency and reliability on the
grid and help societies achieve their long-term energy policy goals. It will be necessary
to fundamentally alter “utility institutional structures” to achieve a successful transition
to the new energy grid envisioned by California (Grueneich et al, 2013). Fortunately,
utility representatives themselves seem to recognize and in fact welcome this trend –
over two-thirds of utilities representatives surveyed indicated a belief that the
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deployment of smart grids – including ESS -and smart meters will create value that far
surpasses industry forecasts (Accenture, 2013).

Although many load serving entities have been disaggregated, they remain the
best positioned entities that currently exist to plan and operate grid assets with benefits
at the level of the entire system in mind. Given the right incentives to do so, utilities will
prove the most valuable ally of energy storage and other smart grid technologies that
are valuable precisely for their ability to allow the grid operate at its most efficient.
Allowing well-regulated utilities to own and operate storage facilities will result in
“socially optimal storage use since these entities would be concerned with both
producer and consumer surplus changes“ (Sioshansi, 2010). Such a utility will use
storage assets to reduce the costs of load balancing to the entire system, because it
will be in their interest to do so. As an expert contact from SoCal Edison argued,
limiting utility ownership of storage capacity under the mandate to 50% of procurement
was not well-informed because when the utility owns an asset it allows for “much more
flexibility…and it drives innovation” (SoCal Edison, Personal Communication, October
2012). Lastly, utilities are large and politically influential entities, and their help may in
fact be needed to achieve many of the policy and market development goals outlined in
the sections above. This point is proven by European utilities like RWE who have
stated that they will “fight for the most reasonable market design” (Beckman, 2013) in
the face of a changing grid.
Though utility representatives seem to be ready for the evolution of their
organizations to occur, this will not occur unless the proper policy and regulatory
environment is created in which utilities can undergo this transformation. This will
involve sacrificing many of their traditional profit streams while creating new incentive
structures for utilities, allowing them to profit from things like distributed generation,
investment in local capacity and distribution lines, and using storage facilities to
minimize the marginal cost of energy produced on the system at any given time. An
alternate route would be to convert California utilities back to public entities, “smart grid
operators” that would be by nature required to do these things, although that would
entail the navigation of difficult political territory and is not likely in the near future.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
In the context of the California electricity grid, energy storage should be viewed
primarily as one potential means to an end – the end being an electricity grid that is
prepared to cope with the challenges that will come with the state’s ambitious
environmental policies. As a complementary good to generation with low
dispatchability, the value of energy storage systems will only grow with increasing
levels of RES penetration. In general, any development that drives the CA electricity
grid toward higher levels of renewables or more effective internalization of the true
time-variant costs of electricity production in the state will make for a higher value of
energy storage. The shifting of the energy use paradigm towards one that establishes
electricity as a marginally-priced good as opposed to a right will also make energy
storage capacity a more valuable product, and consequently create more potential
cost-effective deployments. This is because at the most basic level, the behavior of the
electricity grid as a whole is dictated by electricity demand, or the aggregate behavior
of electricity consumers. The more that end-use electricity prices in the state come to
reflect the true cost of producing and deploying one more unit of energy at the time it is
consumed, the more electricity consumers will come to behave in ways that facilitate
the deployment of load-shifting assets like storage.
On the other hand, contingencies that lead the California electricity grid to tend
towards installation of further 20th century infrastructure and dependency on fossil
fuels, without internalization of the social costs of such stagnation, will devalue storage
systems and their potential applications. This is entirely possible in an energy sector
still dominated by utilities with roots in the 20th century, cheap energy use paradigm,
despite ambitious environmental policy from the state. Garnering the support of electric
utilities is of the utmost importance in transforming the California energy sector into the
electrified, decarbonized one that is needed to achieve the state’s 2050 emissions
goals. To do so, California should look to the strategies adopted by utilities in Germany
and other European states that face the same “existential crisis” as those in California.
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Energy storage eventually will become cost effective for applications on the
California electricity grid. This could occur through disruptive technological change,
supportive policy, or even by process of elimination as all other means of addressing
the reliability concerns that come with an increased level of renewable energy are
expired. With such a potentially transformative technology, it is tempting to advocate
the installation of energy storage as an end in itself, but ultimately this is not how
business is conducted in the energy sector. Technologies must be commercially
proven before even being considered for installation, and even then it is important to
recall that as storage technologies are applied in an application specific approach,
“some of them will be cost-effective a year from now, some 20 years from now” (SoCal
Edison, Personal Communication, October 2013).
The world will be watching as California tests the waters of grid-scale energy
storage in the coming decade, and murky waters they are. The energy storage industry
remains a nascent one and as such will be exposed to the tides of change in
technology, regulation and economics. A multitude of variables will affect whether
these tides shift in favor of or against the deployment of energy storage capacity on a
scale that is sufficient to truly challenge the 20th century electricity grid paradigm of
operational balance. The scenarios constructed in Chapter 4 offer some insight into
potential technical and regulatory changes and the effects they might have on an
energy storage industry, but in the end the development of California’s energy storage
industry will largely be a process of learning-by-doing. The lessons learned by
California’s energy sector will be invaluable to electricity grids around the world, but it is
important to remember that knowledge of this type is largely a public good. While there
is value in being first, energy storage and other “smart grid” technologies should be
deployed only as they become cost-effective, so as not to subsidize this knowledge by
way of an undue burden on electricity consumers in the state of California.
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Appendix 1: 10 Year Market Potential of Energy Storage Industry in California.
1 Electric Energy Timeshift
2 Electric Supply Capacity
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3 Load Following

600
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4 Area Regulation
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2,010

5 Electric Supply Reserve
Capacity
6 Voltage Support

57
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7 Transmission Support
8 Transmission
Congestion Relief
9.1 T&D Upgrade
Deferral 50th percentile
9.2 T&D Upgrade
Deferral 90th percentile
10 Substation On-site
Power
11 Time-of-use Energy
Cost Management
12 Demand Charge
Management
13 Electric Service
Reliability

192
31

192
141

Low: 80% efficiency, 2¢/kWh VOC, 4 hours. High: 80%
efficiency, 1¢/kWh VOC, 5.5 hours.
Low: mid/peak duty cycle combustion turbine, cost
$50/kW-year. High: combined cycle combustion turbine,
cost $99/kW-year.
Low: simple cycle combustion turbine, price $20/MW per
service hour. High: combined cycle combustion turbine,
price $50/MW per service hour.
Low: $25/MW per hour, 50% capacity factor. High
$40/MW per hour, 80% capacity factor. For up regulation
and down regulation.
Low: $3/MW per hour, 30% capacity factor. High $6/MW
per hour, 60% capacity factor.
Low: prevent 1 outage lasting 1 hour over 10 years. High:
prevent 2 outages lasting 1 hour over 10 years. Storage =
5% of load.
Based on DOE/EPRI storage report[14].
Based on CAISO congestion prices in 2007.

481

687

Low: upgrade factor = 0.25. High: upgrade factor = 0.33.

759

1,079

Same as above.

1,800

3,000

Based on cost for standard storage solution.

1226

1226

582

582

359
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14 Electric Service Power
Quality
15 Renewables Energy
Time-shift
16 Renewables Capacity
Firming
17.1 Wind Generation
Grid Integration, Short
Duration
17.2 Wind Generation
Grid Integration, Long
Duration

359

978

233

389

Based on PG&E's A6 time-of-use tariff. Six hours of
storage discharge duration.
Based on PG&E's A6 time-of-use tariff. Six hours of
storage discharge duration.
Low: $20/kWh * 2.5 hours/year of avoided outages for 10
years. High: 10 Years of UPS Cost-of-ownership (present
value).
Low: avoided power quality related cost, 10 years. High:
UPS cost-of-ownership, 10 years (present value).
Low: bulk wind generation. High: baseload RE generation.

709

915

500

1,000

100

782

Low: fixed orientation distributed PV. High: bulk wind
generation.
Though the estimated benefit is relatively high, a modest
amount of storage (<0.1 kW) is needed per kW of wind
generation.
Low: avoid 1 outage in 10 years from wind generation
shortfall. High: high estimate of benefit for reduced
transmisison congestion.

Reproduced with data from Eyer and Corey, 2010.
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Appendix 2: Overview of Extant MW Scale Storage Systems and Basic Metrics
Technology
Option

Maturity

Capacity
(MWh)

Power
(MW)

Duration(
hrs)

%
Total
Cost ($/kWEfficiency Cost
h)
(total
($/kW)
cycles)
Application: Bulk Energy Storage to Support System and Renewables Integration
Pumped
Mature
1680280-530
6-10
80-82
2500420-430
Hydro
5300
(>13,000)
4300
Pumped
Mature
5400900-1400 6-10
80-82
1500250-270
Hydro
14,000
(>13,000)
2700
CT-CAES
Demo
1440180
8
See note 1 960
120
(underground)
3600
(>13,000)
CT-CAES
Demo
1440180
20
See note 1 1150
60
(underground)
3600
(>13,000)
CAES
Commercial 1080
135
8
See note 1 1000
125
(underground)
(>13000)
CAES
Commercial 2700
135
20
See note 1 1250
60
(underground)
(>13000)
SodiumCommercial 300
50
6
75 (4500)
3100520-550
Sulfur
3300
Advanced
Commercial 200
50
4
85-90
1700425-475
Lead-Acid
(2200)
1900
Advanced
Commercial 250
20-50
5
85-90
4600920-980
Lead-Acid
(4500)
4900
Advanced
Demo
400
100
4
85-90
2700
675
Lead-Acid
(4500)
Vanadium
Demo
250
50
5
65-75
3100620-740
Redox
(>10000)
3700
Zn/Br Redox
Demo
250
50
5
60
1450290-350
(>10000)
1750
Fe/Cr Redox
R&D
250
50
5
75
1800360-380
(>10000)
1900
Zn/air Redox
R&D
250
50
5
75
1440290-340
(>10000)
1700
Application: Energy Storage for ISO Fast Frequency Regulation and Renewables Integration
Flywheel
Demo
5
20
0.25
85-87
1950-2200 7800-8800
(>100,000)
Li-ion
Demo
0.25-25
1-100
0.25-1
87-92
1085-1550 4340-6200
(>100,000)
Advanced
Demo
0.25-50
1-100
0.25-1
75-90
950-1590
2770
Lead-Acid
(>100,000)
Application: Energy Storage for Utility Transmission &Distribution Grid Support Applications
AES
Demo
250
50
5
See note 1
1950-2150 390-430
(abovegrou
(>10,000)
nd)
Advanced
Demo
3.2-48
1-12
3.2-4
75-90
2000-4600 625-1150
Lead-Acid
(4500)
SodiumCommercia 7.2
1
7.2
75 (4500)
3200-4000 445-555
Sulfur
l
Zn/Br Flow Demo
5-50
1-10
5
60-65
1670-2015 340-1350
(>10,000)
Vanadium
Demo
4-40
1-10
4
65-70
3000-3310 750-830
IX

Redox
Fe/Cr Flow

R&D

4

1

4

Zn/air
Li-ion

R&D
Demo

5.4
4-24

1
1-10

5.4
2-4

(>10,000)
75
(>10000)
75 (4500)
90-94
(4500)

1200-1600

300-400

1750-1900
1800-4100

325-350
900-1700

Recreated with data from Rastler, 2010.

Appendix 3: California Solar Initiative Metrics
Year
Total CA Electricity Consumption
(MWh) *
Total Electricity Production under CSI
(MWh)
CSI Proportion of Total

2008

2009

2010

2011

268,155,000

259,584,000

258,525,414

272645317.1

46560
0.000173631

203352
0.000783376

306228
0.001184518

506127
0.001856357

Data gathered from Energy Information Administration website at:
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/california/pdf/california.pdf
Regression analysis of CSI program, starting in 2008, yields that CSI production’s proportion of
total CA electricity consumption can be predicted by
y = 0.0001e0.7522x
X

In 2016, with x = 8, y = 0.04099355695, or 4.1% of total consumption.

Appendix 4: Energy Storage Valuation Technology Run Reference and Results
Summary.
Run #

Detail

B/C
Ratio

run1

Use Case 1 (Bulk Energy Storage):
Base Case
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2010 Ref Year
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2010 Ref Year
with P4P regulation prices
Use Case 1:CONE derived with
LMS100
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: low CONE
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2
Replacements
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: No regulation
services
Use Case 1: higher CapEX assumption
Use Case 1: higher variable O&M
assumption
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 3
Replacements
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2X Regulation
Price
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 3 Hour
Duration
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 4 Hour
Duration
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market
Scenario 1
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market
Scenario 2
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market
Scenario 3
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market
Scenario 4
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Flow Battery
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Flow Battery
(high variable O&M)
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Pumped Hydro
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: CAES
Use Case 2 (Ancillary Service Only):
Base Case
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Project Start
Year 2015
Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Project Start
Year 2015 with P4P regulation prices
Use Case 3 (Distributed Storage): Base
Case
Use Case 3 Sensitivity: No regulation
Use Case 3 Sensitivity: 2 Hour

run1 2010
run1 2010P4P
run1 LMS100
run1 lowCONE
run1a
run1b
run1c
run1d
run1e
run2
run3
run4
run10
run11
run12
run13
run16
run16a
run17
run18
run19
run20
run21
run22
run22no reg
run22b

XI

1.17

Breakeven
Capital Cost
($/kWh)(201
3$)
842

Breakeven
Capital
Cost($/kW)(20
13$)
1684

1.05
1.23

565
1079

1130
2159

1.17

824

1649

1.08
1.07

632
619

1264
1238

0.98

433

865

0.91
1.14

842
740

1684
1480

0.97

377

754

1.38

1593

3186

1.10

594

1781

1.05

465

1860

1.24

1010

2020

1.18

851

1701

1.47

1941

3883

1.40

1619

3238

1.23
1.20

675
628

2699
2511

1.32
1.27
1.40

223
232
6712

1783
1853
1678

1.08

755

1509

1.30

1471

2941

1.19

866

3464

1.12
1.35

686
1509

2745
3018

Duration
Use Case 3 Sensitivity: 2X P4P
regulation prices
Use Case 3 Sensitivity: High Load
Growth Rate
Use Case 3 Sensitivity: Flow Battery
Use Case 3 Sensitivity: Project Start
Year 2020

run23
run24
run26
run35

1.35

1326

5306

1.09

634

2537

1.32
1.30

1009
940

4037
3761

Recreated with data from EPRI, 2013.

Appendix 5: Levelised Costs of Electricity From Various Technologies.
2011
Technology

Life
(year)

TypicalP
lant Size
(MW)

Gas open
cycle
Gas CCGT
Hard coal
600
Lignite 600
Hard coal /
Lignite 700
Hard coal
700 + CCS
HC 600 +
Biomass-cofiring
Nuclear
(EPR1600)
Pumped
storage
Run-of-river

25

2030

2050

CAPEX
(EUR/k
W)

Efficie
ncy
(%)

CAPEX
(EUR/k
W)

Efficie
ncy
(%)

CAPEX
(EUR/k
W)

Efficie
ncy
(%)

OPEX per
year % of
invest

250

Operationho
urs
(h)1)(baselo
ad)
6000

650

45

650

45

650

45

3.0%

25
35

400
800

6000
7500

800
1300

60
45

800
1300

62
47

800
1300

62
49

2.5%
2.0%

35
35

800
800

7500
7500

1400

43

1400
2100

47
50

1400
1800

49
52

2.0%
2.0%

35

800

7500

3000

40

2700

41

2.0%

30

800

7500

1390

45

1300

47

1300

49

2.0%

40

1600

7900

3000

36

2600

37

2600

37

2.0%

50-60

250

2500

80

1.0%

6000

90

1.0%

Wind
onshore
Wind offshore (near)
Wind offshore far
Solar PV

25

2-3

1800

N/A

N/A

11002400
8002200
1100

80

20-250

11002400
8002200
1100

80

50-60

N/A

3.3%

25

5

3200

N/A

1800

N/A

1800

N/A

4.3%

25

5

3800

N/A

2200

N/A

2200

N/A

5.0%

25

2000

N/A

1700

N/A

1700

N/A

1.0%

Solar
thermal CSP
Biomass

30

0.0050.5
2-50

N/A

2000

N/A

2000

N/A

2.0%

30

25

7500

11002400
18002200
11001300
20002200
26003000
18002800
30003500
2500

~ 40

2500

~ 40

2500

~ 40

2.5%

2800

Recreated with data from VGB, 2012.
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